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Grid service providers (GSPs), in commercial grids, improve their profitability by maintaining 
the least possible set of resources to meet client demand. Their goal is to maximize profits by 
optimizing resource planning. In order to achieve such goal, they require feedback from clients 
to estimate demand for their service. The objective of this research is to develop an approach to 
build a useful value profile for a collection of heterogeneous grid clients. For developing the 
approach, we use binary feedback as the theoretical framework to build the value profile, which 
can be used as a proxy for a demand function that represents client’s willingness-to-pay for grid 
resources. However, clients may require incentives to provide feedback and deterrents from 
selfish behavior, such as misrepresenting their true preferences to obtain superior services at 
lower costs. To address this concern, we use credibility mechanisms to detect untruthful 
feedback and penalize insincere or biased clients. We also use game theory to study how the 
cooperation can emerge.  
In this dissertation, we propose the use of credibility-based binary feedback to build value 
profiles, which GSPs can use to plan their resources economically. The use of value profiles 
aims to benefit both GSPs and clients, and helps to accelerate an adoption of commercial grids. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Grid computing has been successful enabling the establishment of virtual computing resources in 
large research institutions. A number of information technology (IT) organizations have built 
initial commercial implementations to deliver high-capability services for their own purposes. 
IRC1 forecasts that the grid-computing market will grow from $1.8 billion in 2006 to 
approximately $24.5 billion in 2011 [1]. However, grid computing is still in the early adoption 
phase for mainstream commercial computing. This chapter provides a brief background of grid 
computing technology and a motivation of this dissertation. 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
 
1.1.1. Grid Computing  
Grid computing has emerged as a significant new model of large-scale computing. The Globus 
Alliance2 defines grid computing as [2], 
“The grid refers to an infrastructure that enables the integrated, collaborative use of high-end 
computers, networks, databases, and scientific instruments owned and managed by multiple organizations. 
Grid applications often involve large amounts of data and/or computing and often require secure resource 
sharing across organizational boundaries, and are thus not easily handled by today’s Internet and Web 
infrastructures.” 
 
                                                 
1 Insight Research Corp., market analysis report, Available: http://www.insight-corp.com/ 
2 Globus Alliance, a research and development project, Available: http://globus.org/  
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 Grid computing is a merging of communication networks and computing infrastructure that 
geographically coordinates distributed heterogeneous resources for solving large-scale problems. 
The main objective of grid computing is to significantly reduce the execution time of data 
processing jobs or file sharing jobs while making effective use of resources. Consequently, by 
utilizing excess computing resources spread around the world (from individuals, institutions, and 
organizations), large complex problems can be solved in a sensible amount of time3 without the 
use of supercomputers.  
The difference between non-grid (such as cluster) and grid computing is the way resources 
are managed. In the cluster case, resource allocation is performed by centralized resource 
management systems and resources are usually owned by a single organization [2]. On the other 
hand, in the case of grid computing, resources might be distributed across multiple domains and 
owned by different organizations. This increases complexities when designing grid resource 
management systems. 
 
1.1.2. Grid System Taxonomy 
In this section, we present grid system classification in term of its constructions and objectives. 
Weiss et al. [6, 11] present three different ways in which grids can be constructed: voluntary, 
involuntary, and commercial (centrally formed) grid. According to the resource allocation 
method of each grid model, construction costs of voluntary and involuntary grids are cheaper 
than commercial grids. However, system performance of voluntary and involuntary grids has 
high variance, which makes it difficult to predict. As a result, there is a tradeoff between cost and 
                                                 
3 Given high-capacity grids (such as TeraGrid) that have a larger computing capacity than supercomputers, the total 
computing time for a large complex problem should be significantly decreased. 
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system performance. If the main concern is system performance, commercial grids might be a 
better choice than others because of their predictability. 
According to Krauter et al. [7], grid models are constructed for three main objectives: 
computational grids, data grids, and service grids. Computational grids require a number of CPU 
cycles while data grids require a huge bandwidth. Service grids are hybrid, which require a large 
number of CPUs and significant bandwidth. A summary of grid system taxonomy is presented in 
Table 1.1-Table 1.2. In this dissertation, we mainly concentrate on commercial grid computing.  
 
Table 1.1 Grid Model Description. 
Model Cost System Performance Description Some Current Projects 
 
Voluntary 
Grid 
 
Medium-Low Unpredictable Participants donate their 
idle resources to grid 
projects. In non-profit 
project (altruistic grid), 
donors do not expect any 
reward. But, donors join 
non-altruistic grid because 
of tangible reward 
(monetary or non-
monetary). 
 
Altruistic grid: 
SETI@home4, 
Folding@home5, 
Evolution@home6, and 
ChessBrain7. 
Non-altruistic grid: 
MoneyBee8, GStock9, 
and Gomez Peer10. 
 
Involuntary 
Grid 
(Private Grid)  
Medium-Low Unpredictable, but 
better than voluntary 
Private grids harvest idle 
resources in their 
organizations to achieve 
their purposes. 
 
N/A 
Commercial 
Grid 
(Centrally 
Formed) 
High High Grids are designed for a 
large-scale scientific 
research. They are 
supercomputer-like 
computing network. 
 
TeraGrid11, BIRN12, 
PPDG13, and GriPhyN14 
                                                 
4 SETI@home, The Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence. Available: http://setiathome.berkeley.edu/ 
5 Folding@home distributed computing. Available: http://folding.stanford.edu/ 
6 Evolution@home and evolutionary-research. Available: http://evolutionary-research.net/  
7 ChessBrain, the world’s largest chess computer. Available: http://www.chessbrain.net/  
8 MoneyBee (non-monetary reward). Available: http://uk.moneybee.net/index.asp  
9 GStock (non-monetary reward). Available: http://www.gstock.com/  
10 Gomez Peer (monetary reward). Available: http://peer.gomez.com/aspx/ProgramDetails.aspx  
11 TeraGrid. Available: http://www.teragrid.org/  
12 BIRN, Biomedical Informatics Research Network. Available: http://www.nbirn.net/ 
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Table 1.2 Grid Model Taxonomy. 
Grid Type Description Resource Requirement 
 
Computational Grid Grids that have very high-aggregated-computational 
capacity to solve large-scale problems, such as weather 
modeling, nuclear simulation, and Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
CPU-Intensive 
Data Grid Grids that provide an infrastructure for data storage and 
access, which are distributed over a wide area network 
(WAN), such as digital libraries or data warehouses. 
 
Bandwidth-Intensive 
Service Grid Grids that provide on-demand, real-time collaborative, and 
real-time multimedia services. 
 
CPU-Intensive, and 
Bandwidth-Intensive 
 
 
1.1.3. Commercial Grid Environment 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Typical commercial grid environment. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 PPDG, Particle Physics Data Grid. Available: http://www.ppdg.net/ 
14 GriPhyN, Grid Physics Network. Available: http://www.griphyn.org/ 
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Grid service providers (GSPs) and clients are the two key stakeholders in commercial grids. 
GSPs are agents who control resources and client are users of these resources. Figure 1.1 
illustrates a typical commercial grid environment15. Many studies have modeled grid resource 
brokers and grid schedulers, for example AppLeS, Condor-G, and Nimrod-G. The summary of 
previous studies is provided in Buyya [8]. Thus, in this dissertation, we only concentrate on the 
interaction between clients and GSPs by ignoring the role of brokers. We assume that a client 
directly sends a job (request) based on his/her constraints (such as budget and preferred duration) 
to a GSP, who promises to provide a service to the client according to a service level agreement 
(SLA). The SLA is required to accomplish the goal agreed upon by both the client and the GSP. 
After the job is completed, the GSP returns the result to the client along with the service charge. 
 
1.1.4. Costs of Computing 
 
“The costs of computer systems increase at a rate equivalent to the square root of their power,” stated by 
the Grosch’s law [4, 38]. 
 
Computing costs are not free. Most people think that computing costs of voluntary grids are free 
since participants donate their idle resources to grid projects. To understand the costs of these 
systems, we sent survey questions to several distributed computing projects. Unfortunately, we 
heard back from only four projects, as summarized in Table 1.3. The costs consist of hardware 
cost, software cost, bandwidth cost, and operation cost. Clearly, SETI@home has operation cost 
that far exceed other costs while Folding@home has a big investment in hardware part. 
                                                 
15 Grid resource broker is an agent who finds GSPs for clients while Grid market directory contains a list of all GSPs 
in a market. 
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Involuntary and commercial grids are usually funded by sponsors. For example, between 
2001 and 2005 the NSF16 has supported the TeraGrid project with $240 million. As of early 
2006, all TeraGrid resources provide more than 102 teraflops17 (TFLOPs) of computing 
capability and more than 15 petabytes of data storage with fast access and retrieval over high-
speed networks [5].  
Table 1.3 Cost Survey of Distributed Computing Projects on Dec. 2005. 
Distributed Computing Project  
Cost SETI@home Folding@home Evolution@home ChessBrain 
Server $30,000 $150,000 $2,000 $30,000 
Database $10,000 $10,000 $300 N/A 
Software $1,000/year $0 $300 $0 
Bandwidth $1000/month Paid by Stanford 
University18 
Paid by University 
of Edinburgh19 
Donated by 
BTEG network20 
Network device $5,000 $4,000 N/A Donated 
Operation $350,000/year $50,000/year N/A Donated 
Capacity (TFLOPs) 149.821 20022 N/A N/A 
 
 
1.2. MOTIVATION 
 
GSPs, in commercial grids, improve their profitability by maintaining the least possible set of 
resources to meet client demand [16]. GSPs can increase their profits by either increasing their 
                                                 
16 National Science Foundation (NSF). Available: http://www.nsf.gov/  
17 FLOPs (Floating point Operations Per Second) is used as a measure of a computer’s performance, especially in 
fields of scientific calculations. 
18 Folding@home project is supported by Stanford University. 
19 Evolution@home project is supported by University of Edinburgh. 
20 BTEG Networks host the ChessBrain project using their spare bandwidth. 
21 Anderson and Fedak [37] present the approach to estimate total processing capacity of SETI@home project. The 
result indicates that SETI@home had a processing rate of 149.8 TFLOPs, as of May 2006. 
22 Folding@home has 200,000 active CPUs and the average capacity of each CPU is 1 GFLOPs. 
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revenues or reducing their costs. Increased revenues can be achieved through pricing strategies 
or by upgrading current services. For this dissertation, we concentrate on the latter, which means 
GSPs must acquire more resources. We presume that an upgraded service attracts both new and 
current clients, which can boost GSPs’ revenues. This case usually occurs in busy GSPs that 
have high resource utilization. However, GSPs have to be careful not to overprovision, since 
resources might be idle for long periods of time. This raises the question on how many extra 
resources GSPs should acquire.  
 Instead of upgrading a service, GSPs might decide to downgrade their service to reduce their 
costs by reducing their computing resources. This case commonly happens in GSPs that have 
low resource utilization. The challenge is finding the lowest level of resources that is required to 
satisfy clients. If GSPs downgrade their quality of service (QoS) too much, they might end up 
losing their existing clients. To deal with these tradeoffs, GSPs have to know how clients value 
or rate their services. We believe that this information can help GSPs to estimate client demand 
for services in order to optimize their resource planning. Thus, this dissertation concentrates on 
how to extract this clients’ value, which we refer to it as a value profile for a collection of grid 
clients.  
 As QoS is an essential attribute of demand and cannot be measured until after it is consumed, 
this situation is known as ex-ante opportunism23. In this situation, clients have information about 
some aspects of their satisfaction that GSPs do not (and vice versa). This makes it difficult for 
GSPs to estimate client demand. To improve this situation, feedback models, which work as 
                                                 
23 Ex-ante opportunism frequently arises in a market for “experience goods”, such as services which quality can only 
be evaluated after having consumed them [17]. In our case, clients cannot be assured about the true quality offered 
by GSPs until they have actually received the services. On the other hand, GSPs do not have an incentive to 
advertise any of their weak points. In fact, they have an economic incentive to over-advertise their QoS. With this 
knowledge, clients believe that all GSPs provide an average QoS and will not be willing to pay more than an 
average price. For example, clients, who need a high QoS, will not be willing to pay for a lower QoS and will not 
participate in the market. 
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signaling tools, are required [17]. With feedback models, clients are allowed to rate the received 
services based on their satisfaction. However, clients have to spend time to provide feedback, 
which can be considered as a kind of cost to them. If they cannot clearly see benefits from their 
contributions, they might not have an incentive to provide feedback. Furthermore, clients have 
incentives to provide untruthful feedback since they usually want to consume as many resources 
as possible. Thus, they might have an incentive to lie to receive a better service even though they 
may already be satisfied with the current service. Such conflict could lead to the questions on 
how client feedback can be used for this and how truthful client feedback can be obtained. 
 
1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The main theme of this dissertation is to develop an approach to build a value profile using 
feedback models for a collection of heterogeneous grid clients, which GSPs can use as a proxy 
for demand to plan their resources economically. The goals of this dissertation are to study how 
client demand can be estimated for services and how the cooperation can emerge. By 
understanding the conditions that allow it to emerge, it may be possible to suggest the 
development of cooperation in a particular set of conditions and provide the development of 
credibility-based binary feedback model for grid resource planning. Consequently, this 
dissertation is directed by the following key research questions: 
 
• Does a value profile improve resource planning for GSPs? 
• Does a value profile benefit clients? 
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• What information is valuable for GSPs? What can be obtained from clients? Is there a 
gap? If so, does it matter? Can/should the value profile be public? 
• How can the binary feedback model be used to build a value profile? If so, under what 
circumstances? 
• Do clients have an incentive to cooperate? If not, can an incentive be created? Does the 
incentive alter the optima of GSPs? 
• Do clients have an incentive to be truthful? If not, can incentives/penalties be created? 
What is the impact of the incentives? 
 
The outcome of this dissertation will create a useful value profile that can be used to estimate 
service demand for a collection of heterogeneous grid clients. A value profile will represent 
client’s willingness-to-pay for grid resources so it will function as a proxy for a demand function. 
With the use of value profiles, it will assist GSPs when making capital investment decisions and 
help to accelerate an adoption of commercial grids. 
 
1.4. DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
 
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a background and a review of the 
available literature about grid resource management systems and grid resource allocation 
approaches. Chapter 3 presents research design, research questions, and experimental design. As 
stated in the research questions in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 presents theoretical frameworks and 
analysis tools used in this dissertation, which are binary feedback model, credibility mechanism, 
and game theory. Chapter 5 describes an approach to build a value profile using binary feedback 
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for a collection of grid clients and justifies its concept. Chapter 6 explores significant issues 
related to the use of binary feedback for grid resource planning, which are mainly on cooperation 
and trust between GSPs and clients. The development of cooperation in a particular set of 
conditions and the development of credibility-based binary feedback model for grid resource 
planning are also presented in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 shows benefits of value profiles, limitations 
of results, and model implementations, respectively. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this 
dissertation and discusses the future research. 
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2. GRID RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
 
According to the complexities of grid resource allocation, researchers have developed multiple 
grid resource management systems (RMSs). The previous studies concentrate on both technical 
and techno-economic aspects. Krauter et al. [7] present the taxonomy and survey of non-
economic-based grid RMSs, and Yeo and Buyya [39] present a summary of economic-based grid 
RMSs. 
This dissertation mainly concentrates on commercial grids that allow clients to specify their 
QoS constraints; consequently, this chapter discusses only market-based RMSs. Section 2.1 
reviews the state-of-art in market-based RMSs. Next, Section 0 reviews grid resource allocation 
approaches. Finally, Section 2.3 summaries the current literature and identifies the absent issues.  
 
2.1. MARKET-BASED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
 
This section describes market-based RMSs using real-world market concepts to assign resources 
to clients based on a SLA. Figure 2.1 shows a traditional market-based RMS for commercial 
grids [2, 7, 8, 39]. The model consists of several core functions and two interfaces: client 
interface and GSP interface. A client submits a job (request) with specific QoS constraints (for 
example, budget and preferred duration) to the QoS broker via the client interface. Likewise, a 
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GSP manages its own resources or other’s resources via the GSP interface. When the broker 
receives the job, it is responsible for examining the QoS constraints. Then, the admission control 
will decide whether to accept or reject the job based on system utilization. This is to ensure that 
the system is not overloaded and the job will be completed successfully.  
 
  
Figure 2.1 Interaction between components in a traditional market-based RMS for commercial grids. 
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The pricing mechanism determines how the job is charged, but more generally works as a 
tool for managing demand and supply. The way that the client negotiates a service price with the 
broker depends on a market model. Table 2.1 summarizes economic models used regularly in 
market-based RMSs [39]. 
The scheduler is responsible for resource discovery, resource trading, resource selection, job 
assignment, job resource reservation, and job monitor. The idea is to assign the job to the most 
appropriate resource based on SLA, scheduling policy, and pricing. The scheduler also tracks 
both resource and job status. The resource discoverer interacts with the resource information 
service to identify available resources. The co-allocator is required when making reservations of 
multiple nodes for a single job. 
Table 2.1 Economic Model Description. 
ECONOMIC MODEL DESCRIPTION 
 
Commodity Market GSPs specify prices and clients pay for the resources that they consume. Prices 
can be flat or variable. A flat rate means that price is fixed for a certain time 
period, while a variable rate means that price changes dynamically based on the 
demand and supply at that time period. 
 
Posted Price Similarly to commodity market, the difference is that GSPs might advertise 
special offers to clients. 
 
Bargaining Both GSPs and clients negotiate an acceptable price.  
 
Tendering / Contract-net Clients announce their requirements to invite bids from GSPs. After evaluating 
the requirements, if GSPs are interested, they will respond with bids. 
 
Auction Clients bid service from one GSP. The type of auction can be first-price, 
Vickrey, Dutch, English, and double. 
 
Bid-based Proportional 
Resource Sharing 
Each client consumes a proportion of resources based on his/her bid. 
 
 
Community / Coalition / 
Bartering 
A group of GSPs or clients shares their own resources to build a cooperative 
sharing environment. 
 
Monopoly and Oligopoly A single GSP (monopoly) or a number of GSPs (oligopoly) decides the market 
price, where demand does not any affect on the price. 
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 After the job is completed, the result is sent back to the scheduler. The resource information 
service will update the list of available nodes. The accounting mechanism calculates the 
computing cost and then charges the client for the resource that was actually consumed. Finally, 
the broker will return the result to the client along with the bill.  
 In this dissertation, we hypothesize that the inclusion of the value profile for a collection of 
clients into RMSs will assist the scheduler in allocating and planning resources more efficiently 
and effectively. We further hypothesize that this value profile can be constructed using a client 
suitably designed feedback mechanism. The feedback component will interact with the 
scheduler, the resource discoverer, and the co-allocator. Basically, clients will be allowed to 
leave feedback based on the received services via the client interface. The feedback component 
will collect all feedback information from clients and create a value profile, which will inform 
the scheduler. Then, the scheduler will update the resource discover or the co-allocator on how 
many resources it should acquire.  
 
2.1.1. QoS Support 
In telecommunications, QoS usually refers to qualities such as network bandwidth, delay, jitter, 
and throughput. However, in grid computing, it does not make sense to guarantee only network 
components since most grid jobs require high-performance computing capability or data storage 
and access. As a result, GSPs have to guarantee not only network components but also CPU 
processing cycles and data storage capacities of computing nodes.  
 An End-to-end QoS can be classified into three levels: none, soft, and hard. The first level, 
none is the same as best effort, which means services are not guaranteed. Soft QoS arises when 
the QoS broker establishes SLA, but cannot enforce all resources to meet the SLA requirements. 
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On the other hand, if the broker can enforce all resources to guarantee the SLA, it is called hard 
QoS. In short, most market-based RMSs support only soft QoS [39]. 
 
2.1.2. Survey of Market-based RMSs 
 
Table 2.2 Summary of Grid Market-based RMSs. 
System Economic Model Brief System Description 
 
Bellagio Auction This system uses a centralized auctioneer to 
allocate resources to higher bidder first. 
 
CATNET Bargaining Each client negotiates service price until a 
provider accepts it. 
 
Faucets Tendering / Contract-net Clients are allowed to specify QoS contracts, 
and then bid for resources. 
 
Gridbus Commodity market This system supports data-oriented 
applications, and allocates resources based on 
time or cost optimization. 
 
Gridmarket Auction This system uses double auction where 
providers set floor prices and clients set 
ceiling prices. 
 
Nimrod/G Commodity market This system allows clients to specify preferred 
duration and budget constraints. It allocates 
resources based on time or cost optimization. 
 
NWIRE [10] Auction This system applies auction model to choose 
the best resources according to user QoS 
requirements.  
 
OCEAN Bargaining, 
Tendering/Contract-net 
This system allows clients to find the best 
provider by using their negotiation 
mechanism. 
 
Tycoon Auction This system use auction share that estimates 
proportional share based on latency-sensitive 
and risk-averse applications [39]. 
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Yeo and Buyya [39] examine the applicability and suitability of existing market-based RMSs for 
supporting grid computing. Table 2.2 shows a summary of market-based RMSs, along with their 
adopted economic model. In this dissertation, we use a commodity market and a service price is 
variable.  
 
2.2. GRID RESOURCE ALLOCATION APPROACHES 
 
Grid resource allocation corresponds to on-demand provision of grid resources [15]. The task of 
resource allocation involves resource discoverer, resource co-allocator, and resource reservation. 
The objectives of resource allocation are (1) to acquire enough resource capacities for each job 
request with its QoS constraints, and (2) to optimize resource utilization. However, resource 
allocation is still a hard problem caused by sophisticated client behavior in term of willingness-
to-pay for grid resources. 
Researchers have proposed several resource allocation approaches; this section mainly 
discusses resource allocation approaches based on economic principles. Buyya [8] introduces 
GRid Architecture for Computational Economy (GRACE) to regulate demand and supply of 
available resources. His work concentrates on providing an incentive to resource owners to 
contribute resources and motivates resource users to consider a trade-off between computing cost 
and computing time. However, the author does not concentrate on how resource owners optimize 
their resource planning. 
ChunLin and Layuan [9] concentrate on market-based resource allocation by investigating 
interactions between client agents, service agents, and resource agents. They present two-level 
market based resource pricing to optimize resource allocation. The two-level grid market is 
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composed of a service market that regulates prices based on benefits of service agents and client 
agents, and a resource market that is charged for service agents and resource agents. The result 
shows that the two-level market outperforms a one-level market in terms of job completion time 
and resource allocation efficiency.  
Gomoluch and Schroeder [13] investigate under which circumstances market-based resource 
allocation by continuous double auctions and by the proportional share protocol, respectively, 
outperforms a conventional round-robin approach. The results show that continuous double 
auctions perform the best in most cases. Wolski et al. [12] investigate G-commerce 
computational economies for controlling resource allocation in computational grid settings. They 
compare the efficiency of resource allocation between commodity markets and auctions. Their 
results indicate that commodity markets are a better option for controlling grid resources than 
auctions. Subramoniam et al. [18] use a commodity market based approach for resource 
allocation, and develop an algorithm to determine resource prices. For non economic-based 
work, Siddiqui et al. [15] introduce a mechanism of grid capacity planning for optimized QoS 
with negotiation-based advance reservation of grid resources.  
In short, previous studies do not concentrate on how resource owners optimize their resource 
planning and how to extract a value profile for a collection of grid clients.  
 
2.3. SUMMARY 
 
This chapter reviews the literature of resource management systems and resource allocation 
approaches in grid computing. The previous studies concentrate on building market-based 
resource allocation, providing incentives to resource owners to contribute resources, motivating 
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resource users to trade-off between budget and preferred duration, and investigating the 
efficiency of different market-based resource allocation in different aspects. None of them try to 
incorporate clients’ perceived value. We believe that an appropriate framework requires to 
optimally plan resources based on the value profile.  
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Given the review of market-based RMSs in Chapter 2, this chapter is designed to incorporate 
clients’ value and to estimate demand for services. Section 3.1-Section 3.2 present the research 
outline and the research questions of this dissertation, respectively. Finally, Section 3.3 illustrates 
multiple sets of experiments with statistical testing. 
 
3.1. RESEARCH OUTLINE 
 
The main objective of this dissertation is to develop an approach to build a value profile using 
feedback models for a collection of heterogeneous grid clients, which GSPs can use as a proxy 
for demand to plan their resources economically. The objectives are to study how client demand 
can be estimated for services and how cooperation can emerge. The review of the literature on 
grid RMSs, in Chapter 2, shows that most previous work concentrated on market-based resource 
allocation without the use of the service value to grid clients. We believe that the use of this 
value profile will benefit both GSPs and clients. Consequently, this dissertation is directed by the 
following key research questions: 
• Does a value profile improve resource planning for GSPs? 
• Does a value profile benefit clients? 
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• What information is valuable for GSPs? What can be obtained from clients? Is there a 
gap? If so, does it matter? Can/should the value profile be public? 
• How can the binary feedback model be used to build a value profile? If so, under what 
circumstances? 
• Do clients have an incentive to cooperate? If not, can an incentive be created? Does the 
incentive alter the optima of GSPs? 
• Do clients have an incentive to be truthful? If not, can incentives/penalties be created? 
What is the impact of the incentives? 
 
Demand information is necessary for GSPs to optimally plan their resources but it is costly 
and difficult to estimate. In this dissertation, we propose a value profile to serve as a proxy for a 
demand function. To do so, we propose the use of binary feedback model to build the value 
profile for a collection of heterogeneous grid clients. The binary feedback model allows clients 
to rate GSPs based on quality of received services. This aggregate feedback would assist GSPs in 
achieving a better level of client satisfaction effectively and allocating their resources 
economically. Besides, clients would learn the true QoS of each GSP [17]. 
In reality, clients may not be truthful and cooperative. In most cases, feedback contributions 
do not directly benefit the feedback providers, while other entities benefit more directly. Thus, 
individuals have a little economic incentive to provide feedback even if it is socially optimal for 
them to do so [17]. Furthermore, clients have incentives to provide untruthful feedback since 
they usually want to consume as many resources as possible. Thus, they might have an incentive 
to lie to receive a better service even though they may already be satisfied with the current 
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service. To deal with these issues, we propose the use of credibility mechanisms to detect 
untruthful feedback and penalize insincere or biased clients24 [26]. 
Then, we have to study how the cooperation can emerge. By understanding the conditions 
that allow it to emerge, it may be possible to suggest the development of cooperation in a 
particular set of conditions and provide the development of credibility-based binary feedback 
model for grid resource planning. Thus, we also propose the use of game theory as a tool to 
construct and analyze strategic scenarios. In this dissertation, we concentrate on non-cooperative 
games of GSP vs. client and client vs. client. These games are non-zero sum games in which two 
players (GSP and client) can decide whether to cooperate with the other player or not. The only 
concern of each individual player is to maximize his/her payoff, without any concern for the 
other player’s payoff. 
We design this research by assuming that both GSPs and clients are rational and GSPs 
always prefer to cooperate. We also assume that commercial grid market is a competitive market 
where no GSPs or clients have the market power to influence prices. Both GSPs and clients 
know prices set by all GSPs, and they act independently. In this dissertation, we only concentrate 
on a particular interaction between GSPs and clients in the market.   
The following describes more explicitly the research deliverables of this dissertation in the 
remaining chapters. 
                                                 
24 A bias is a prejudice in the sense for having a preference to one particular perspective, which is considered to be 
unfair. Dellarocas [55] classifies biased (or unfair) feedback into four cases: unfairly high rating, unfairly low 
rating, negative discrimination, and positive discrimination. Unfairly high rating results in an inflated GSP feedback 
profile while unfairly low rating results in an incorrectly low GSPs’ feedback profile. Negative discrimination 
occurs when GSPs provide a good service to all clients except a few specific clients. On the other hand, positive 
discrimination occurs when GSPs provide remarkably a good service to a few selected clients and average service to 
others. According to the authors [55, 56, 57], unfair rating has a significant effect on feedback models that have a 
wide range of rating scales, such as Amazon.com. Since we will use binary feedback, there is less opportunity for 
unfairly high or low ratings. 
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• Chapter 4 reviews theoretical frameworks and analysis tools used in this dissertation. The 
key is to use the binary feedback model to construct value profiles and the credibility 
mechanism to detect untruthful feedback and penalize insincere or biased clients. We also 
use game theory to study cooperation and trust between GSPs and clients. 
• Chapter 5 describes an approach to construct a value profile using binary feedback for a 
collection of heterogeneous grid clients, as hypothesized in the first research question in 
Section 3.2. The challenge is to justify whether the value profile can function as a proxy 
for a demand function.  
• Chapter 6 identifies significant issues related to the use of binary feedback for grid 
resource planning, as hypothesized in the second and the third research questions in 
Section 3.2. With the use of game theory, we examine whether GSPs and clients have an 
incentive to cooperate and to be honest. The key is to study whether credibility 
mechanism can help the cooperation to emerge.  
• The development and specification of the credibility-based binary feedback model are 
also presented in Chapter 6. The effect of untruthful feedback is also investigated in this 
Chapter by varying values of probability of contribution P(contribution), probability of 
giving untruthful feedback P(untruthful), and client’s QoS threshold λj.  
• Chapter 7 sets up experiments to determine benefits of the use of value profiles based on 
particular pre-assumptions in the forth and the fifth research questions in Section 3.2. We 
begin with building resource cost function from the TPC-C Benchmark25 since it is 
required for resource optimization. The key is finding an economic equilibrium point to 
                                                 
25 The Transaction Processing Performance Council (TPC) is a non-profit corporation founded to define transaction 
processing and database benchmarks. TPC-C Benchmark is an on-line transaction processing (OLTP) benchmark, 
which measures the performance of transaction processing systems. Available at http://www.tpc.org   
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acquire resources, which is the intersection of a demand curve and a long-run average 
total cost (LATC) curve. The results and discussions are also given in this Chapter. 
• The results from the experiments can be referenced to demonstrate how value profiles 
will benefit both GSPs and clients. The main contribution of this work is the credibility-
based binary feedback model that can be used to construct value profiles, which will help 
GSPs optimize their long run resource investment and help to accelerate an adoption of 
commercial grids. 
 
3.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This section describes five research questions according to the use of credibility-based binary 
feedback model for grid resource planning.  
 
• (Q1) Can the binary feedback model be used to construct a useful value profile for 
GSPs? In other words, binary feedback can be used as a proxy for demand. 
o (Q1.1) From clients’ perspective, can the number of jobs with positive feedback 
in each price range represent an inverse demand curve and function as a proxy for 
a demand function? 
o (Q1.2) From GSPs’ perspective, can clients’ feedback information represent an 
inverse demand curve and function as a proxy for a demand function? 
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• (Q2) Do clients have incentives to cooperate? In other words, clients have incentives to 
provide untruthful feedback to maximize their payoffs. Given feedback game26, if both 
the client and the GSP are rational, then payoffclient (truthful feedback) > payoffclient 
(untruthful feedback). 
 
 
•  (Q3) Can credibility mechanisms be used to encourage clients to be truthful? In other 
words, credibility mechanisms are required for the cooperation to emerge. Given the 
credibility-based feedback game27, payoffclient (truthful feedback) > payoffclient (untruthful 
feedback). 
 
• (Q4) Does a value profile improve resource planning for GSPs? 
o (Q4.1) Does the use of value profiles result in an increment of GSP’s profit 
€ 
profiti ? In other words, given without_value_profiles and with_value_profiles 
scenarios, then 
€ 
profitiwith _ value _ profiles > profitiwithout _ value _ profiles . 
o (Q4.2) Does the use of value profiles result in a decrement of idle resources? In 
other words, given without_value_profiles and with_value_profiles scenarios, 
system utilization 
€ 
ρi  increases 
€ 
ρi
with _ value _ profiles > ρi
without _ value _ profiles. 
o (Q4.3)  Does the use of value profiles result in an increment of client satisfaction 
rate? In other words, given without_value_profiles and with_value_profiles 
scenarios, percentage of positive feedback 
€ 
%pos_ fbi  increases 
€ 
%pos_ fbiwith _ value _ profiles >%pos_ fbiwithout _ value _ profiles. 
                                                 
26 See Section 6.2.3 
27 See Section 6.2.4 
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•  (Q5)  Does a value profile benefit clients? 
o (Q5.1) Does the use of value profiles result in an increment of clients’ job success 
rate? In other words, given without_value_profiles and with_value_profiles 
scenarios, clients’ job success rate 
€ 
% jobsuccess, j  increases 
€ 
% jobsuccess, jwith _ value _ profiles >% jobsuccess, jwithout _ value _ profiles. 
 
3.3. ANALYTICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
This section describes how we test the five research questions. To do so, we create three sets of 
experiments. The first set is designed to test the research question Q1. We perform this 
experiment by varying service prices, clients’ maximum budgets, and clients’ maximum 
preferred durations. Then, we measure the mean number of jobs with positive feedback. Table 
3.1 summarizes factors used in this full factorial design with 100 replications. Figure 3.1 presents 
the algorithm design using in the first experiment set.  
The second set is designed to test the research questions Q2 and Q3. We design non-
cooperative games to study cooperation and trust of GSP vs. client and client vs. client. In the 
feedback games, the GSP has to decide either Trust or Don’t trust clients’ feedback. The client 
has to decide to provide either Truthful or Untruthful feedback. Then, we apply the concept of 
credibility mechanisms into the feedback games to observe whether the cooperation can emerge. 
The third set is designed to test the research questions Q4 and Q5 by varying job loads, 
service rates, and values of probability of giving untruthful feedback P(untruthful). Then, we 
measure the mean of 
€ 
ρi , 
€ 
%pos_ fbi , and 
€ 
% jobsuccess, j  when not using value profiles, and 
compare these results to when using value profiles. Table 3.2 summarizes factors used in this full 
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factorial design with 50 replications. Figure 3.2 shows the algorithm design using in this 
experiment. For statistical testing on this experiment set, we perform paired t-test on the mean of 
results, as summarized in Table 3.3. For 
€ 
profiti judgment, we draw a graph based on the mean of 
total revenue and total cost.  
 
Table 3.1 Full Factorial Design for Q1 
Factors Levels 
pi (service prices) • (Q1.1) pi = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, … , 1.0} 
• (Q1.2) pi is varied based on system utilization 
max_budget {10, 20} 
max_preferred_duration28 {5, 20} 
# of experiments 
€ 
11× 2 × 2 ×100 = 4,400  
 
 
Table 3.2 Full Factorial Design for Q4 and Q5 
Factors Levels 
Job Load • Low demand 
o NUM_CLIENTS = 5,000 
o Interarrival rate = 0.3 jobs/min 
• High demand 
o NUM_CLIENTS = 50,000 
o Interarrival rate = 0.5 jobs/min 
Service Rate (jobs/min) {0.24, 0.40, 0.84, 1.25, 1.62, 2.20} 
P (untruthful) {0, 1} 
# of experiments 
€ 
2 × 6 × 2 × 50 =1,200 
 
                                                 
28 The value of maximum budget and preferred duration can be any number. We select these ranges of values so that 
we can observe how a demand curve shifts when clients increase or decrease their constraints. 
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Table 3.3 Statistical Testing Methods 
Research Question Dependent Variable Method 
Q4.2 ρi Paired t-test on the mean of 
dependent variable 
Q4.3 % pos_fbi Paired t-test on the mean of 
dependent variable 
Q5.1 % jobsuccess, j Paired t-test on the mean of 
dependent variable 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Algorithm design for Q1. 
Algorithm Design for Q1
SET each client's constraint (budget, deadline, and no_of_jobs)
FOR all clients' job
         WHILE a client still has jobs to submit              
              server announces server_estimate_price and server_estimate_computing_time
                  IF client_remain_budget ! server_estimate_price THEN
                      CALCULATE possible_job_done if a client submit his/her job at this price
                           IF client_remain_jobs " possible_job_done THEN
                                IF client_deadline ! server_estimate_computing_time THEN
                                    SUBMIT job to queue
                                    WAIT until job is done
                                    DECREASE no_of_jobs
                                    RECORD total_service_price and total_computing_time
                                    CALCULATE satisfaction
                                    PROVIDE feedback based on the satisfaction
                                         IF satisfaction ! 0 THEN
                                             feedback = 1 (positive)
                                             COUNT no_of_jobs_with_positive_feedback
                                         ELSE IF satisfaction " -#j THEN
                                             feedback = 0 (negative)
                                             COUNT no_of_jobs_with_negative_feedback
                                         ELSE IF -#j < satisfaction < 0 THEN
                                              NO RATE
                                         END IF
                                    CALCULATE client_remain_budget
                                         IF client_remain_budget ! 0
                                             Repeat submitting job process
                                         END IF
                                ELSE
                                         WAIT for other period
                                END IF
                           ELSE
                                WAIT for other period
                           END IF
                   ELSE
                           WAIT for other period
                   END IF
           END WHILE
END FOR
(budget, preferr d_duration, and no_of_jobs)
preferr d_duration ! server_estimate_computing_time THEN
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Figure 3.2 Algorithm design for Q4 and Q5. 
Algorithm Design for Q4 and Q5
1. Client j decides whether to submit a job based on his/her constraint, as presented in 
Figure 3.1.
2. Scheduler: After receiving job from client j, the scheduler will check the pun_state of 
that client. 
    IF pun_state=false THEN
         the scheduler will start process that job.
    ELSE
         the job will be hold during punishment period (tp) before start processing.
    ENDIF
2. Binary feedback: When the job is completed, the client will be asked to provide 
feedback based on the received service. 
    IF pun_state=false THEN
         the client is allowed to provide feedback
         the client provides feedback based on his/her satisfaction (Sj),
         CALCULATE satisfaction, Sj()
             IF Sj ! 0 with P(contribution) THEN
                 he/she rates positive "1"
             ELSE IF Sj ! 0 with (1-P(contribution)) THEN
                 he/she does not rate
             ELSE IF Sj " -#j (client threshold) with P(contribution) THEN
                 he/she rates negative "0"
             ELSE IF Sj " -#j with (1-P(contribution)) THEN
                 he/she does not rate             
             ELSE IF -#j < Sj < 0 with (1-P(untruthful)) THEN
                 he/she does not rate
             ELSE IF -#j < Sj < 0 with P(untruthful) THEN
                 he/she rates negative "0"
             ENDIF
    ELSE
         the client is not allowed to provide feedback since he/she is under punishment.
         RESET pun_state=false
         RETURN
    ENDIF
3. Credibility mechanism: GSP will check the received feedback FBj
received
 by 
comparing with the expected feedback FBj
expected  based on the performance record 
tj
computing
    IF FBj
received =  FBj
expected
 THEN
            COUNT this feedback information
            UPDATE value profile
            CALCULATE the percentage of positive feedback
    ELSE
            DISCARD this feedback information
            punish this client
            SET pun_state=true
    ENDIF
4. Resource allocation: GSP will use the value profile as a proxy for a demand function 
to find equilibrium point to optimally acquire resources.
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4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND ANALYSIS TOOLS 
                                  
This chapter reviews theoretical frameworks and the analysis tools used in this dissertation. To 
construct a value profile that is useful to GSPs, we use binary feedback, which is a form of on-
line reputation. Thus, in this chapter, we examine the prior research on binary feedback and 
introduce the way in which binary feedback can be used to construct the value profile. First, 
Section 4.1 discusses online reputation mechanisms and their effects. Then, Section 4.2 presents 
the use of binary feedback model as the framework to understand a client satisfaction and to 
build the value profile. The concept of value profiles is introduced in Section 4.2.1. Next, Section 
4.3 presents the use of credibility mechanisms to handle insincere or biased clients. Finally, 
Section 4.4 describes game theory as the tool to study conflict and cooperation in resource 
planning, following Turocy and Stengel [21].  
 
4.1. ONLINE REPUTATION 
 
Online reputation mechanisms, also known as feedback systems, have been emerged as a 
significant quality signaling and a control mechanism in private e-markets such as eBay29 and 
                                                 
29 www.ebay.com  
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Amazon30 [17, 24]. The objective of reputation mechanisms is to encourage trust and 
cooperation in online trading communities.  Reputation systems are designed to collect feedback 
information from individual traders’ past behavior and publish it to communities as an individual 
feedback profile. This profile is available for potential future trading parties to assess 
trustworthiness and reliability. The success of future transactions depends on how people behave 
today. It is not only with their recent partner, but also others as well.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 A typical eBay member’s ID and member profile, as of Feb 2007. 
  
The willingness of buyers to bid on or pay for items is a function of quality, a utility31 of 
goods (or services) and a risk of “bad” transaction32 being traded [52]. Thus, sellers are required 
                                                 
30 www.amazon.com  
31 In economics, utility is a measure of the satisfaction or happiness gained by consuming goods and services.  
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to provide buyers with sufficient information about their product and transaction quality. In the 
same way, buyers are required to provide sellers with their transaction history since sellers prefer 
to sell products to buyers who do not have any bad transaction history.  
 Today, the most well-known feedback mechanism is the one used by eBay. Since 
transactions in eBay are not contractual guarantees, traders trust other trading parties according 
to their member profiles, as shown in Figure 4.1. eBay uses a two-way feedback mechanism that 
buyers and sellers can rate one another at the end of transactions. The ratings can be negative (-
1), neutral (0), or positive (+1). eBay users also have opportunity to leave short text comments, 
and rated partners can respond to unfair comments. These ratings summarize into an individual 
feedback score by taking the sum of positive ratings minus the sum of negative ratings. eBay 
uses the feedback score as a reputation indicator of individual member in its community. 
 
4.1.1. The Effect of Online Reputation 
Normally, a reputation score of sellers is an indication of the trustworthiness of sellers even 
though it is based on past transactions, not the current one. A number of studies have observed 
how eBay reputations affect sale prices. Resnick et al [52] summarized related studies on the 
impact of reputation on price and probability of sale. Most results indicate that positive feedback 
increases price and probability of sale. On the other hand, negative feedback decreases price and 
probability of sale.   
 For example, Melnik and Alm [51] conclude that sellers with the better reputation can expect 
to receive a higher price for an auction good. Similarly, Lucking-Reiley et al [53] present an 
exploratory analysis of determinants of prices in eBay. They conclude that sellers’ feedback 
                                                                                                                                                             
32 A “bad” transaction is one that fails after the auction closes or where the product or service does not measure up 
to expectations. 
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ratings have an effect on auction prices. Positive feedback ratings have a smaller effect than 
negative feedback ratings do. This means that eBay users concentrate on sellers’ negative 
feedback ratings. The authors find that 
1% increase in the seller’s positive feedback ratings yield a 0.03% increase in the auction price on 
average…in the opposite direction, 1% increase in the seller’s negative feedback ratings causes a 0.11% 
decrease in auction price on average. 
 
A client usually has a particular point of view or an ideological perspective when providing 
feedback. The larger the interval rating scale33, the more the level of complexity of an individual 
preference will increase. For example, given a rating scale 1-10, “10” does not mean the same 
thing to all clients. Besides, rating “7” and “8” might be huge different or indifferent based on 
clients’ perspective. To simplify this complexity, we use the binary feedback model, which has 
only “0” and “1”, in this dissertation. 
 
4.2. BINARY FEEDBACK MODEL 
 
Similar to eBay’s feedback mechanism, the binary feedback model is a mechanism where clients 
(buyers) can only rate past transactions as either “positive” (1) or “negative” (0). Positive ratings 
indicate that clients received high quality or satisfactory services (or goods), and negative ratings 
indicate that clients received low quality or unsatisfactory services. The summary of ratings is 
publicly available to all clients. As a result, clients know the quality of GSPs (sellers) based on 
the summary of their most recent ratings [25].   
 According to Dellarocas [24], quality can be divided into three categories; real quality (qr), 
advertised quality (qa), and estimated quality (qe). Real quality is unknown to clients in advance 
                                                 
33 Rating scales are a set of numbers broadly used to obtain indications of client opinions of services. The objective 
is to extract information that is considered to reflect the magnitude of the perceived QoS [62]. 
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and can only be determined after consumption. Generally, clients prefer higher quality to lower 
quality, although their willingness to pay for extra quality varies. Advertised quality, controlled 
by GSPs, informs clients through advertising, and it may or may not relate to real quality. 
Estimated quality is determined from the information that is available to clients. In conlusion, 
clients can estimate the quality from advertised quality and GSPs’ rating profile. 
 This quality information can be used to calculate client satisfaction, which is the difference 
between real quality and estimated quality. A client decides whether to rate a transaction based 
on satisfaction (Sj). If the real utility exceeds the expected utility (Sj>0), the client should rate 
that transaction as positive. On the other hand, if the real utility falls below some threshold (λj) 
of the expected utility (Sj≤-λj), the client should rate that transaction as negative. Furthermore, if 
the client receives slightly bad but not very bad service (-λj<Sj≤0), the client may not provide 
any feedback [24].  
 In this dissertation, we adopt this approach to allow clients to report their satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with their service consumption.  
 
4.2.1. Value Profiles 
Since the demand function either for a client or for a group of clients is hard to obtain, most 
studies assume a utility function and use it to calculate the price that clients are willing to pay. 
We assert that a feasible way to obtain the willingness to pay of clients is to use feedback models 
such as the binary feedback model. As discussed in Section 4.2, positive feedback implies that a 
client is satisfied with the received service in term of cost and time, and he/she is willing to pay 
for such service at another future time. Negative feedback implies that a client is unsatisfied with 
the received service, and he/she may not be willing to pay for such service again. Therefore, in 
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this dissertation, we propose the use of binary feedback to deduce the willingness to pay for a 
collection of clients. 
 
 
Figure 4.2  The concept of value profiles. 
 
 By obtaining feedback information, as presented in Figure 4.2, GSPs can create a value 
profile that can be used as a proxy for demand for a collection of heterogeneous grid clients. This 
value profile will collect and tabulate satisfactory feedback as a function of price. We will show 
that this value profile represents the willingness to pay of clients at different prices so it can 
function as a proxy for a demand function.  However, since clients may not be truthful and 
cooperative, GSPs have to filter out the untruthful feedback to improve an accuracy of value 
profiles. Therefore, the use of credibility mechanisms is proposed to detect undesired feedback 
and penalize insincere or biased clients, as discussed in the following section. 
 
4.3. CREDIBILITY MECHANISMS 
 
Since trust is a significant issue in grid computing, many studies have been done in this area [41, 
42, 43, 44, 45, 46]. For example, Weiss and Huang [11] present different trust requirements in 
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various grid models. They concentrate on both non-security related expectations (e.g. matching, 
accounting) and security related expectations (e.g. authorization, authentication, free of spyware 
and virus). 
In this dissertation, we concentrate on client’s feedback trustworthiness. We propose the use 
of credibility mechanisms that allow GSPs to detect and penalize insincere or biased clients, who 
intend to lie to receive better services. The objective is to ensure that sincere clients will always 
receive more benefit than insincere clients. 
We adopt the credibility mechanism that is proposed by Papaioannou and Stamoulis [26], as 
shown in Figure 4.3. The authors introduced a non-credibility (ncr) and a binary 
punishment_state variable to punish insincere clients and limit potential unfairness. Entering a 
system, each client is assigned a moderately high initial non-credibility value ncr0 (a lower ncr is 
the better). The initial punishment_state of each client is false, which means that an individual is 
not being punished. To enter grid computing process, a punishment_state has to be false and a 
ncr value has to be less than or equal to an accepted credibility (acr). 
 After a transaction, a client rates the GSP either positive or negative. Then, the GSP checks 
whether the received feedback (fc) is reliable or not by comparing that feedback with its 
quantifiable performance (fgsp). If the GSP disagrees with the feedback (fc ≠ fgsp), the client’s ncr 
value is increased by x (ncr = ncr+x), and he/she is punished (punishment_state = true) for some 
periods of time and the untruthful feedback is discarded. During the punishment period, the 
client cannot process any transaction. On the other hand, if the client’s feedback is consistent 
with the quantifiable performance  (fc=fgsp), the value of client’s ncr is decreased by y (ncr = 
ncr-y), where 0<y<x and ncr >0 and the truthful feedback is sent to the reputation system. This 
process repeats when a new job enters a system.  
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 On the other hand, GSPs might have an incentive to cheat and disregard unfavorable 
feedback, which we will analyze in Section 6.3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Credibility mechanism, modified from [26]. 
 
 
4.4. GAME THEORY 
 
Game theory has been applied in many different research areas, for example, political science, 
political economy, public choice, economics and business, biology, sociology, philosophy, logic, 
and computer science. In computer science, researchers use game theory to study trustworthy 
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behavior in transactions [23, 47, 48, 49]. In this dissertation, we use game theory to analyze 
cooperation and trust between GSP vs. client and client vs. client.  
 Game theory34 is the formal study of conflict and cooperation and can be applied wherever 
players choose different actions based on their interest. The players can be individuals, groups, 
firms, organizations, or any combination of these. The purpose of game theory is to formulate, 
construct, analyze, and understand strategic situations. 
 Games consist of a set of players, a set of strategies available to those players, and the 
specification of payoffs for each strategy combination. A classic assumption of games is that all 
players are rational, which means that they make choices based on their maximum payoff. The 
objective of game analysis is to forecast how rational players play games against each other. 
However, dominant strategies do not always exist. Thus, the Nash equilibrium (NE) is a solution 
where no player can improve their payoff by changing their strategy unilaterally.  
 Games can be represented in two different forms: Strategic Form and Extensive Form. 
Strategic games are a principal form for non-cooperative games with rational players. As shown 
in Figure 4.4(a), these games are represented by a matrix, which lists each player’s strategies and 
payoffs with every possible combination of choices. Payoffs can be determined from each 
player’s utility function. These games usually assume that both players move simultaneously, or 
that later movers do not have any information about the earlier players’ moves.  
 Extensive games are a game tree, as presented in Figure 4.4(b). These games are sequential 
games, where later players have information about earlier moves. The information can be either 
perfect or imperfect. In general, these games can be analyzed in their form or in strategic form.   
 
                                                 
34 The field of game theory was established by the 1944 publication Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by 
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern [22]. In 1950, John Nash proved that finite games always have an 
equilibrium point, given that players choose actions that are the best payoff for them. 
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Figure 4.4 Game theory models. 
 
  Extensive games with perfect information can be analyzed using the backward induction 
method starting from root of a game tree. Backward induction commonly specifies unique 
choices at the players’ decision nodes. However, if a player has two or more indifferent choices 
at a node, he/she may randomly make a move. This affects the earlier player since his/her payoff 
depends on the later player. In this case, the backward induction becomes an inappropriate 
method. Moreover, not all Nash equilibria can be found using the backward induction method.  
As a result, these games have to be converted into their equivalent strategic forms. With this 
transformation, these games are analyzed in a complete move plan and all strategic combinations 
are analyzed to result in a set of feasible Nash equilibria. 
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5. VALUE PROFILES 
 
Given the first research question Q1, this chapter describes an approach to construct a value 
profile using binary feedback for a collection of heterogeneous grid clients. To develop the 
approach, we must first build a simple model of GSPs and clients. Using these simple models, 
we can show that a value profile is useful for grid resource planning. Since they are economic 
actors, we refer to them as GSP agents and client agents. GSP agents are resource owners who 
manage all grid resources and client agents are resource users who request a service and pay for 
received service. The specifications of GSP agents and client agents are given in Section 5.1-
Section 5.2, respectively. Then, Section 5.3 describes assumptions made for this dissertation and 
justifies the concept of value profiles, respectively. Finally, Section 5.4 summarizes this chapter. 
 
5.1. GSP AGENTS 
 
GSP agents provide services to clients based on a SLA. In each period, the agents announce an 
estimated service price to clients. For this dissertation, the price varies based on the utilization of 
system, which we express as [54] 
€ 
piest = ai + bi ∗ ρi 1− ρi( )
 
 
 
 
 
  
(5.1) 
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The agents also announce an estimated computing time, which we take to be the mean response 
time of the system. Table 5.1 provides notations and parameters of GSP agents. 
Table 5.1 General Parameters of GSP Agents. 
Symbol Description 
 i GSP index 
€ 
piest  Estimated price for computing a job in that period, 
which equals an estimated cost to the client 
€ 
ai  Constant for adjusting pricing range 
€ 
bi  Constant for adjusting pricing range 
€ 
ρi  Average utilization of system i in that period 
 
 
5.2. CLIENT AGENTS 
 
We assume that clients are usually satisfied when a job is completed within their preferred 
duration and budget. Thus, the client satisfaction can be calculated from the difference between 
the change in computing time (
€ 
% Δ tjcomputing) and the change in computing cost (
€ 
% Δ Cjcomputing). 
The change in computing time is defined as percentage of the difference between preferred 
duration (
€ 
t jpreferred _ duration ) and total computing time (
€ 
tjtotal _ computing), while the change in computing 
cost is defined as percentage of the difference between job budget (
€ 
cjexp) and real cost (
€ 
cjreal ). 
Since clients have different budget and preferred duration constraints, we also include constraint 
sensitivity (∝j) in the calculation. Consequently, we express client satisfaction (Sj) as (see Table 
5.2 for the summary of notations and parameters of client agents) 
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€ 
S j =α j ∗ % Δ t jcomputing( ) − 1−α j( )∗ % Δ C jcomputing( ) (5.2) 
where 
€ 
%Δt jcomputing =
(t jpreferred _ duration − t jtotal _ computing )
t jpreferred _ duration
 
(5.3) 
€ 
% Δ Cjcomputing =
cjexp − cjreal( )
cjexp
 
(5.4) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2 General Parameters of Client Agents. 
Symbol Description 
 j Client index 
Sj Service satisfaction of client j after his/her job is 
completed 
∝j Constraint sensitivity of client j 
€ 
t jpreferred _ duration  Preferred duration for completing a job of client j 
€ 
tjtotal _ computing Total computing time for completing a job of client j 
€ 
% Δ tjcomputing Percentage of the difference between preferred duration 
and total computing time for completing job of client j 
€ 
cjexp  Expected cost (job budget) for completing job of client j 
€ 
cjreal  Real cost for completing job of client j 
€ 
% Δ Cjcomputing Percentage of the difference between expected cost (job 
budget) and real cost for completing job of client j 
FBj Binary feedback of client j  
λj QoS threshold of client j 
 
  
 42 
 Unless otherwise specified, we assume that clients are truthful and cooperative. According to 
Section 4.2, after a service, each client provides binary feedback FBj based on the value of 
his/her satisfaction, which is expressed as (see Table 5.2 for the summary of notations and 
parameters of client agents) 
€ 
FBj =
"1" if S j ≥ 0
"0" if S j ≤ −λ j
no rate if − λ j < S j < 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5.5) 
 
5.3. ASSUMPTIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
We make a number of simplifying assumptions in this dissertation so that we can concentrate on 
the proof of the concept of value profiles. Some of these assumptions can be relaxed in future 
research. First, we offer jobs to the grid from heterogeneous clients that have different budgets 
and preferred durations. As shown in Figure 3.1, clients will decide whether to submit a job 
based on GSPs’ service announcement subject to clients’ constraints. We also assume that each 
client has a different number of jobs to process and is able to submit only one job at a time. 
Then, we assume that jobs have the same size. For this experiment, we also assume that clients 
are cooperative and truthful. 
To simplify the model, we use a M/M/1 queuing system with First Come First Serve (FCFS) 
policy, which means that there is only one GSP in this commodity market. Thus, the price 
increases when the system utilization increases: the price is high during peak periods (high 
utilization) and low during off-peak periods (low utilization). This helps to regulate demand by 
encouraging clients who have low budgets and long preferred durations to wait for an off-peak 
period. However, some clients might prefer paying high costs to receive results as soon as 
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possible. We also assume that having another GSP will not affect an outcome since prices 
dynamically change based on system utilization that corresponds to client demand.  
 In this dissertation, like purchasing airline tickets35, we assume that prices will be fixed after 
GSPs and clients have an agreement but the completion time is uncertain. Thus, the estimated 
service cost is the same as the final cost (%ΔC = 0). We also assume that there is no discount rate 
for clients when GSPs miss a preferred duration because we want a true client satisfaction. 
Moreover, we assume the market is a competitive market. 
 To justify the concept of value profiles in Section 4.2.1, we conducted the first set of 
experiments to determine whether value profiles are consistent with the demand theory. Table 
5.3-Table 5.4 present the values of parameters and the design for the first research question, 
respectively. The results are presented as the mean number of jobs with positive feedback in each 
price range.  
Figure 5.1-Figure 5.2 show the resulting value profiles from the clients’ perspective and the 
GSPs’ perspective, respectively. The curves clearly have the shape of typical demand functions 
since the number of jobs with positive feedback and the number of total jobs submitted to the 
system are inversely proportional to the service prices. Moreover, these curves shift up and to the 
right when clients increase their maximum budget or preferred duration (and vice versa).  
From the clients’ perspective, at a price of 0.4, if they increase their budget from 10 to 20, the 
number of jobs with positive feedback and the number of total submitted jobs will increase from 
136 to 323 and from 174 to 441, respectively, as shown in Figure 5.1(a). If clients also increase 
their preferred duration from 5 to 20, the number of jobs with positive feedback and the number 
of total submitted jobs will increase to 531 and 633, respectively, as shown in Figure 5.1(b). 
 
                                                 
35 When purchasing airline tickets, we pay a certain price but we do not know whether a flight will be delayed. 
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Table 5.3 Model Parameters for Research Question Q1 
 Parameters Values 
ENVIRONMENT NUM_CLIENTS 
Interarrival rate 
Service rate 
100 
0.6 jobs/min 
1.0 jobs/min 
CLIENT AGENTS 
 
Budget 
Preferred duration 
No_of_Jobs 
λj (client’s QoS threshold) 
αj 
tretransmit 
P(contribution) 
P(untruthful) 
Uniform (1, max_budget) 
Uniform (1, max_preferred_duration) 
Uniform (1, 50) 
0 
1 
1000 min 
1 
0 
GSP AGENTS ai 
bi 
0 
0.1 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 Full Factorial Design for Research Question Q1 
Factors Levels 
pi (service price) 
 
max_budget 
max_preferred_duration 
• (Q1.1) pi = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, … , 1.0} 
• (Q1.2) pi vaires based on system utilization 
{10, 20} 
{5, 20} 
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Figure 5.1 Demand curves based on value profiles from the clients’ perspective (a) max_budget = {10, 20} and 
max_preferred_duration = {5} (b) max_budget = {10, 20} and max_preferred_duration = {20}. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Demand curves based on value profiles from the GSPs’ perspective (a) max_budget = {10, 20} and 
max_preferred_duration = {5} (b) max_budget = {10, 20} and max_preferred_duration = {20}. 
 
 
From the GSPs’ perspective, at a price of 0.3, if clients increase their budget from 10 to 20, 
the number of jobs with positive feedback and the number of total submitted jobs will increase 
from 451 to 770 and from 634 to 1035, respectively, as shown in Figure 5.2(a). If the clients also 
increase their preferred duration from 5 to 20, the number of jobs with positive feedback and the 
number of submitted jobs will increase to 865 and 1123, respectively, as shown in Figure 5.2(b).  
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Figure 5.3 Demand curves based on value profiles from the GSPs’ perspective as computing time (minutes) vs. 
number of jobs with positive feedback when max_budget = {10, 20} and max_preferred_duration = {5, 20}. 
 
 
Clearly, the results both from the clients’ perspective and from the GSPs’ perspective 
indicate that when clients’ constraints change, value profiles can capture clients’ willingness-to-
pay at different prices. This is consistent with demand theory. Therefore, we believe that a value 
profile can function as a proxy for a demand function. 
Furthermore, as prices vary based on system utilization, value profiles can be viewed as the 
clients’ willingness-to-pay of clients at different QoSs. Figure 5.3 displays the demand curves 
from the GSPs’ perspective, which are presented as the mean number of jobs with positive 
feedback at different computing times (in minutes). Undoubtedly, demand curves shift up and to 
the right when clients relax their constraints. As shown in Figure 5.3, at the computing time is 
equal to 2.5, the number of jobs with positive feedback will increase from 100 to 145 if clients 
increase their budget and preferred duration from (10, 5) to (20, 20). Figure 5.4 presents three-
dimensional demand curves, which are presented as the mean number of jobs with positive 
feedback at different values of price and computing time. Clearly, the results indicate that the 
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lower the price and the computing time, the more the client will demand. This is also consistent 
with the demand theory. 
 
  
 
  
 
Figure 5.4 Three-dimensional demand curves based on value profiles (price vs. computing time vs. no. of jobs with 
positive feedback) (a) max_budget = {10} and max_preferred_duration = {5} (b) max_budget = {20} and 
max_preferred_duration = {5} (c) max_budget = {10} and max_preferred_ duration = {20} (d) max_budget = {20} 
and max_preferred_duration = {20}. 
 
 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
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5.4. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter, we describe how we construct value profiles using binary feedback for a 
collection of heterogeneous grid clients, which GSPs can use to economically plan their 
resources. From the experiments, the results visibly indicate that value profiles have the shape 
and characteristics of demand functions. Value profiles also consist with the demand theory since 
they represent clients’ willingness-to-pay for grid resources at different prices. Therefore, binary 
feedback can be used to construct value profiles, which GSPs can use as proxies for demand 
functions. This accepts what we hypothesize in the first research question Q1.  
 For the rest of this dissertation, we will use value profiles as proxies for demand functions. 
We believe that the use of value profiles can assists GSPs in finding an economic equilibrium 
point to plan their resource base. 
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6. ISSUES IN USING BINARY FEEDBACK FOR GRID RESOURCE PLANNING 
 
This chapter discusses significant issues related to the use of binary feedback for grid resource 
planning. In reality, clients might not be truthful and cooperative. Section 6.1 determines 
whether clients have incentives to cooperate and to be truthful. The development of cooperation 
in a particular set of conditions and the development of credibility-based binary feedback model 
for grid resource planning are presented in Section 6.1 and Section 6.2, respectively. Next, 
Section 6.3 analyses GSPs’ incentive to cheat and disregard unfavorable feedback. Finally, 
Section 6.4 investigates the effect of untruthful feedback.  
 
6.1. CLIENTS’ INCENTIVES 
 
The objective of this section is to explore clients’ incentives related to the use of binary 
feedback. According to Dellarocas et al. [17], feedback contributions do not directly benefit the 
feedback providers, while other entities benefit more directly. Thus, individuals might have a 
small economic incentive to provide feedback even if it is socially optimal for them to do so. 
 First, Section 6.1.1 demonstrates the effect of feedback contributions. Then, Section 6.1.2 
studies an incentive to cooperate and how to create this incentive. Next, Section 6.1.3-Section 
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6.1.4 investigate trust in feedback models and explain how to promote truthful feedback, 
respectively. 
 
6.1.1. The Effect of Feedback Contributions 
As value profiles are based on a number of jobs with positive feedback, the probability that 
clients would provide feedback, P(contribution), might affect the outcome of value profiles. 
With the low P(contribution), GSPs might have less feedback information to estimate client 
demand. To investigate this effect, we do a sensitivity analysis of P(contribution) as presented in 
Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1 Sensitivity Analysis of P(contribution) 
 Parameters Values 
ENVIRONMENT NUM_CLIENTS 
Interarrival rate 
Service rate 
1000 
1.0 jobs/min 
1.0 jobs/min 
CLIENT AGENTS 
 
Budget 
Preferred duration 
No_of_Jobs 
λj (client’s QoS threshold) 
αj 
tretransmit 
P(contribution) 
P(untruthful) 
Uniform (1, 20) 
Uniform (1, 15) 
Uniform (10, 50) 
Uniform (-2, 0) 
1 
1000 min 
{0.0, 0.2, 0.6, 1.0} 
0 
GSP AGENTS pi 
ai 
bi 
Vary based on system utilization 
0 
0.1 
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 In this experiment, after a service, each client provides binary feedback FBj based on the 
value of his/her satisfaction, which is expressed as (see Table 5.2 for the summary of notations 
and parameters of client agents) 
€ 
FBj =
"1" if S j ≥ 0 with P(contribution)
"no rate" if S j ≥ 0 with 1− P(contribution)
"0" if S j ≤ −λ j with P(contribution)
"no rate" if S j ≤ −λ j with 1− P(contribution)
"no rate" if − λ j < S j < 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(6.1) 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The effect of feedback contributions. 
 
 Figure 6.1 shows the result of sensitivity analysis of P(contribution). The results are 
presented as differences in the number of jobs with positive feedback when the values of 
P(contribution) change36. Because of the law of demand, the big differences occur at the low 
                                                 
36 For P(contribution)=1.0, clients will always provide feedback. For P(contribution)=0.6, the probability that 
clients will provide feedback is 0.6. For P(contribution)=0.2, the probability that clients will provide feedback is 
0.2. For P(contribution)=0.0, clients will not provide any feedback. 
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price. Clearly, P(contribution) has an effect on value profiles by reducing the preciseness of 
demand estimation.  Therefore, we have to study how to create incentives to cooperate.  
 
6.1.2. Incentives to Cooperate 
Clients do not cooperate unless they receive some benefits from their contribution. Like eBay 
reputation, eBayers receive benefits in their future trading. Even there, eBay persistently prompts 
transacting parties to leave feedback. In our study, GSPs ask clients to spend time to provide 
feedback after they receive a result, which can be considered as a kind of cost to them. If clients 
cannot clearly see benefits from their contribution, they do not have any economic incentives to 
cooperate with GSPs. As a result, we require a mechanism to create clients’ incentive to 
cooperate.  
 We use an individual effort model to explain how to encourage feedback contributions, as 
presented in Figure 6.2. Clearly, people work hard when they think their effort will help them 
achieve outcomes that they value [31]. After providing feedback, clients will continue their 
contribution if they obtain noticeable benefits, which can be achieved through providing 
“selective incentives” and by publishing “community activity”. 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Individual effort model. 
   
 
 53 
 According to Olson [30],  
 The incentive must be “selective” so that those who do not join the organization working for the 
group’s interest … can be treated differently from those who do. These “selective incentives” can be either 
negative or positive, in that they can either coerce by punishing … or they can be positive inducements 
offered to those who act in the group interest… Only an organization that sold private or noncollective 
products, or provided social or recreational benefits to individual members, will have a source of these 
positive inducements. 
 
In our case, GSPs have to treat feedback-providing clients37 better than non-feedback-providing 
clients38. For example, in queuing, schedulers can set higher priority to feedback-providing 
clients. Therefore, schedulers will process jobs from feedback-providing clients before those 
from non-feedback-providing clients. Giving feedback-providing clients a better price can be 
also considered as a kind of noticeable benefits.   
 
 
Figure 6.3 A typical eBay feedback profile, as of May 2008. 
 
 Another way to increase clients’ motivation to make contributions is to show their 
community activities [32]. For example, like eBay, GSPs can show their feedback profiles, as 
                                                 
37 Clients who provide feedback to GSPs. 
38 Clients who do not provide feedback to GSPs. 
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shown in Figure 6.3. The percentage of positive feedback can be calculated from the number of 
jobs with positive feedback divided by the total number of processed jobs. This percentage 
represents how the GSP manages jobs according to the SLA agreed upon by both the client and 
the GSP. 
 Therefore, GSPs can increase clients’ incentives to cooperate by making sure that feedback-
providing clients always receive more benefits than non-feedback-providing clients. 
Furthermore, by publishing GSPs’ feedback profile, it prevents GSPs from over-advertising their 
service; as a result, it benefits future potential clients to understand the true quality of GSPs.  
 
6.1.3. Incentives to be Truthful 
Rationally, self-interested individuals want to maximize their own payoff without any concern 
for the other’s payoff. In our case, clients prefer to consume as many resources as possible within 
their budgets. In a good service case, although they may already be satisfied with the current 
service, they may still want a better service by lying to GSPs. If GSPs believe them, they will 
receive an upgraded service without any extra costs. On the other hand, in a bad service case, 
clients can receive more benefits by lying that the service is a lot worse than it is. Accordingly, 
they have an economic incentive to provide untruthful feedback. We assert that a feasible way to 
promote honesty in feedback models is to use credibility mechanisms. 
 The use of credibility mechanisms enables GSPs to detect and penalize insincere or biased 
clients. The idea is to ensure that sincere clients always receive more benefits than insincere or 
biased clients. Therefore, clients will fear of punishments and will provide truthful feedback 
because of higher payoffs.  
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6.1.4. Promoting a Truthful Feedback 
We have assumed that clients will decide whether to submit a job based on GSPs’ service 
announcement subject to clients’ constraints. We also have assumed that prices will be fixed 
after GSPs and clients have an agreement. In order to detect untruthful feedback, we have to 
make additional assumptions. We assume that when clients decide to submit their job, it means 
that they are willing to pay at that price and their preferred duration is greater than or equal to the 
estimated computing time (
€ 
t jpreferred _ duration ≥ estimated _computing_ time ). Therefore, GSPs can 
use the estimated computing time as the reference of clients’ preferred duration. In this 
dissertation, we assume that clients’ preferred duration is equal to the estimated computing time (
€ 
t jpreferred _ duration = estimated _computing_ time ). 
 With clients’ preferred duration information (
€ 
t jpreferred _ duration ), GSPs can detect and penalize 
insincere or biased clients by comparing 
€ 
t jpreferred _ duration  with their quantifiable performance 
record, as described in Section 4.3. The idea is that GSPs will record the total computing time (
€ 
tjtotal _ computing) of each job, and then evaluate the received feedback based on the difference 
between 
€ 
t jtotal _ computing  and 
€ 
t jpreferred _ duration . GSPs usually expect to receive positive feedback if they 
can finish jobs within preferred durations39, and vice versa. Thus, the expected feedback (
€ 
FBjexp) 
can be expressed as 
€ 
FBjexp =
"1" if t jtotal _ computing ≤ t jpreferred _ duration
"0" if t jtotal _ computing > t jpreferred _ duration
 
 
 
  
 
(6.2) 
 If the received feedback does not match to what GSPs expected (
€ 
FBjexpected ≠ FB jreceived ), that 
feedback is considered as untruthful feedback and will be discarded. Moreover, that client will be 
                                                 
39 As discussed in Section 5.3, we assumed that an estimated service cost is the same as the final cost (%ΔC = 0). 
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held for some periods of time (
€ 
t jpenalty ) before receiving next service and will not be allowed to 
provide any feedback after that service. If they are allowed to provide feedback, they will 
provide negative feedback because of the longer computing time (
€ 
t jgreedy _ computing = t jtotal _ computing + t jpenalty). This might drop the percentage of positive feedback and 
lead to the wrong outcome. On the other hand, if the received feedback matches to the expected 
feedback (
€ 
FBjexpected = FB jreceived ), that feedback will be counted. This process will continue until 
there are no new jobs; as a result, we believe that the use of credibility mechanism can promote 
truthful feedback40. The algorithm of this mechanism is provided in Figure 6.4. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Algorithm of credibility mechanism [26]. 
                                                 
40 See Credibility-based feedback games in Section 6.2.4. 
Algorithm of Credibility Mechanism
After GSPs receive a client's job
     
       CHECK client's punishment state
       
       IF pun_state = false THEN
              PROCESS  the job
       ELSE
              HOLD the job for penalty time
       END IF
After GSPs receive client's feedback
      
       CHECK whether the received feedback is reliable     
                     by comparing to what GSPs expected
       
       IF FBj(received) = FBj(expected) THEN
              COUNT  the truthful feedback 
       ELSE
              DISCARD the untruthful feedback
              PENALIZE the client
       END IF
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6.2. ANALYSIS OF CLIENTS’ INCENTIVES  
 
Given clients’ incentives in Section 6.1, this section presents analysis results using game theory. 
First, Section 6.2.1 defines a payoff of an individual player. Then, Section 6.2.2 analyzes quality 
choice games in different pricing scenarios to explain why clients’ feedback plays an important 
role in grid resource planning. Then, Section 6.2.3 analyzes feedback games to study the 
cooperation between GSP vs. client and client vs. client. Finally, Section 6.2.4 determines 
whether the use of credibility mechanisms can help the cooperation to emerge. 
 
6.2.1. Individual Payoff 
Before starting game analyses, we have to define a payoff of each individual player. Two key 
players are a GSP and a client. The profit (payoff) for a GSP is known as 
€ 
P = R− C  (6.3) 
where R is revenues from providing a service to a client, and C is costs of providing that service. 
We assume that a GSP always sets its revenues to cover its costs (R > C > 0). 
 The payoff for a client is defined as 
€ 
P = Q − R (6.4) 
where R is the service cost that the client has to pay, which is equivalent to the revenue R of the 
GSP. Q is the client’s perceived value, which decays exponentially with time; this represents the 
QoS that the client received from the GSP. Therefore, in this function, the value of Q is 
proportional to the difference between preferred duration and total computing time, which we 
express as  
€ 
Q = Re(t
preferred_duration−t total_computing )  (6.5) 
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 For each strategic combination, a payoff of each player is calculated from the difference 
between his/her payoff before making a decision and that after making such decision, which we 
express as 
€ 
PGSP = ΔR −ΔC
Pclient = ΔQ−ΔR
 (6.6) 
For the following games, these payoffs mainly depend on specified step-level parameters when 
upgrading or downgrading a service in each case. 
 
6.2.2. Quality Choice Games without Feedback Information 
The objectives of quality choice games are to illustrate how GSPs and clients cooperate without 
any feedback and to justify why value profiles are necessary for optimal resource planning.  
These games are sequential move games with perfect information, following Turocy and Stengel 
[21]. 
6.2.2.1. Game Setup 
Suppose player I is a GSP and player II is an existing client. The GSP makes the first move, 
choosing between two levels of service: Upgrade (U) or Downgrade (D). Upgrading a service 
requires further investments (higher costs), and these costs are independent of whether the client 
continues that service or not. Downgrading a service can reduce the GSP’s costs.   
Table 6.2 Pricing Scenarios. 
Strategy Description 
Flat Whether the GSP upgrades or downgrades the service, the price is still the same. 
Fair After upgrading the service, the price increases to cover the upgrade costs. 
After downgrading the service, the price decreases since the GSP reduces its costs. 
Selfish After upgrading the service, the price increases more than covering the upgrade costs. After 
downgrading the service, the price does not decrease even though the GSP reduces its costs. 
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 Then, the client is informed about the GSP’s choice and has to decide whether to Continue or 
to Discontinue that service. Consequently, these games have four strategic combinations: 
(Upgrade, and then Continue), (Upgrade, and then Discontinue), (Downgrade, and then 
Continue), and (Downgrade, and then Discontinue). Table 6.2 presents three pricing scenarios 
used to explore these games. 
6.2.2.2. Case I: GSP vs. Client with Flat Pricing 
 
In this scenario, whether the GSP upgrades or downgrades the service, the price is still the same. 
Table 6.3 summarizes how parameters in this quality choice game change. Figure 6.5 and Table 
6.4 present this game model and its strategic form, respectively. 
Table 6.3 Quality Choice Game Parameters in Case I, where 0 < ω < 1. 
 Upgrade Downgrade 
Quality Q = (1+ω)*Q Q = (1-ω)*Q 
Revenue R = R R = R 
Cost C = (1+ω)*C C = (1-ω)*C 
 
In Figure 6.5, if the GSP has chosen to upgrade the service, then the client prefers to 
continue, since the resulting payoff of ωQ is larger than -Q+R when discontinuing. If the GSP 
has chosen to downgrade the service, then the client decides to either continue or discontinue 
based on the value of ω. First equilibrium, if the GSP slightly downgrades the service (small 
value of ω), then the client prefers to continue since the resulting payoff of -ωQ is larger than (-
Q+R) when discontinuing. In this case, the GSP prefers to downgrade the service, which results 
in the payoff of ωC, to upgrade, which leads to the payoff of -ωC. 
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Figure 6.5 Quality choice game between GSP and client in Case I, where Q>R>C>0 and 0<ω<1. 
  
   
 
Table 6.4 Strategic Form of Quality Choice Game in Case I, where Q>R>C>0 and 0<ω<1. 
II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
U: Cont’ 
D: Cont’ 
 
U: Cont’ 
D: Discont’ 
 
U: Discont’ 
D: Cont’ 
 
U: Discont’ 
D: Discont’ 
 
Upgrade (U) 
ωQ 
-ωC 
ωQ 
-ωC 
-Q+R 
-R-ωC 
-Q+R 
-R-ωC 
 
Downgrade (D) 
-ωQ 
ωC 
-Q+R 
-R+ωC  
-ωQ 
ωC 
-Q+R 
-R+ωC  
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 Second equilibrium, if the GSP downgrades the service too much (large value of ω), then the 
client prefers to discontinue, since the resulting payoff of -Q+R becomes larger than -ωQ when 
continuing.  In this case, the GSP prefers to downgrade the service, which results in the payoff of 
–R+ωC, to upgrade, which leads to the payoff of -ωC. However, the GSP might also prefer to 
upgrade the service, since the payoff of -ωC might be larger than –R+ωC when downgrading, as 
shown in Table 6.4. As a result, the shaded areas in Table 6.4 represent three possible Nash 
equilibria: (Upgrade, Continue), (Downgrade, Continue), and (Downgrade, Discontinue). The 
detail of each strategic combination is described in Table 6.5. 
 
 
Table 6.5 Payoff Matrix Detail for Case I. 
Choice Combination GSP Client 
 
GSP: Upgrade 
Client: Continue 
Although, the service price does not 
cover the upgrade costs, the GSP still 
earns its revenues. This decision 
decreases GSP’s benefit.  
The client is very happy because he/she 
receives a better service without 
additional costs. The client gains a lot 
of benefits from this decision. 
 
GSP: Upgrade 
Client: Discontinue 
Not only the GSP loses money in 
upgrading the service, but also loses the 
client. This decision is not effective. 
The client just wants to discontinue the 
service although he/she can receive a 
better service. He/she is not satisfied 
with the service. There is no benefit 
from this decision. 
 
GSP: Downgrade 
Client: Continue 
The GSP succeeds at reducing its costs 
while still keeping the existing client. 
So, the GSP gains benefit from this 
decision. 
Although the QoS is lower, the client is 
still satisfied with it. This decision 
decreases client’s benefit since the 
client still has to pay the same price. 
 
GSP: Downgrade 
Client: Discontinue 
Although the GSP can reduce its costs, 
the GSP loses the existing client. This 
decision is not effective.  
The client is not willing to pay the same 
price to receive a lower QoS. There is 
no benefit from this decision. 
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6.2.2.3. Case II: GSP vs. Client with Fair Pricing 
In this case, after upgrading the service, the price increases to cover the upgrade costs. On the 
other hand, after downgrading the service, the price decreases since the GSP can save its costs. 
Table 6.6 summarizes how parameters in this quality choice game change. Figure 6.6 and Table 
6.7 present this game model and its strategic form, respectively. 
 
Table 6.6 Quality Choice Game Parameters in Case II, where 0 < ω < 1. 
 Upgrade Downgrade 
Quality Q = (1+ω)*Q Q = (1-ω)*Q 
Revenue R = (1+ω)*R R =(1-ω)*R 
Cost C = (1+ω)*C C = (1-ω)*C 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6.6 Quality choice game between GSP and client in Case II, where Q>R>C>0 and 0<ω<1. 
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Table 6.7 Strategic Form of Quality Choice Game in Case II, where Q>R>C>0 and 0<ω<1. 
II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
U: Cont’ 
D: Cont’ 
 
U: Cont’ 
D: Discont’ 
 
U: Discont’ 
D: Cont’ 
 
U: Discont’ 
D: Discont’ 
 
Upgrade (U) 
ωQ- ωR 
ωR-ωC 
ωQ- ωR 
ωR-ωC 
-Q+R 
-R-ωC 
-Q+R 
-R-ωC 
 
Downgrade (D) 
-ωQ+ωR 
-ωR+ωC 
-Q+R 
-R+ωC  
-ωQ+ωR 
-ωR+ωC 
-Q+R 
-R+ωC   
  
 In Figure 6.6, first equilibrium, if the GSP has chosen to upgrade the service, then the client 
prefers to continue, since the resulting payoff of ωQ-ωR is larger than -Q+R when discontinuing. 
If the GSP has chosen to downgrade the service, then the client prefers to continue, since the 
resulting payoff of -ωQ+ωR is larger than -Q+R when discontinuing. In this case, the GSP 
prefers to upgrade the service, which results in the payoff of ωR-ωC, to downgrade, which leads 
to the payoff of -ωR+ωC.  
Table 6.8 Payoff Matrix Detail for Case II. 
Choice Combination GSP Client 
 
GSP: Upgrade 
Client: Continue 
The GSP increases the service price to 
cover the upgrade costs, and the client 
can afford it. So, the GSP still gains 
benefit.  
 
The client is willing to pay additional 
costs to receive a better service. The 
client still gains benefit from this 
decision. 
GSP: Upgrade 
Client: Discontinue 
Not only the GSP loses money in 
upgrading the service, but also loses the 
client. This decision is not effective. 
 
The client does not want to pay 
additional costs even though he/she can 
receive a better service. There is no 
benefit from this decision. 
 
GSP: Downgrade 
Client: Continue 
The GSP reduces the service price to 
keep the existing client. This decision 
decreases GSP’s benefit. 
 
The client is satisfied with a lower 
service and price. This decision 
decreases client’s benefit. 
GSP: Downgrade 
Client: Discontinue 
Although the service price decreases, 
the GSP still loses the existing client. 
This decision is not effective.  
The client is not satisfied to with a 
lower QoS although the price is 
cheaper. There is no benefit from this 
decision. 
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In Table 6.7, the (Downgrade; U: Discon’t, D: Con’t) cell is also the equilibrium but it is not 
the optimal choice. The shaded areas in Table 6.7 represent two Nash equilibria: (Upgrade, 
Continue) and (Downgrade, Continue). The detail of each strategic combination is presented in 
Table 6.8. 
 
6.2.2.4. Case III: GSP vs. Client with Selfish Pricing 
 
In this case, after upgrading the service, the price increases more than covering the upgrade 
costs. On the other hand, after downgrading the service, the price does not decrease even though 
the GSP can save its costs. Table 6.9 summarizes how parameters in this quality choice game 
change. Figure 6.7 and Table 6.10 present this game model and its strategic form, respectively. 
Table 6.9 Quality Choice Game Parameters in Case III, where 0 < ω < k < 1. 
 Upgrade Downgrade 
Quality Q = (1+ω)*Q Q = (1-ω)*Q 
Revenue R = (1+k)*R R =R 
Cost C = (1+ω)*C C = (1-ω)*C 
 
 In Figure 6.7, if the GSP has chosen to upgrade the service, then the client decides to either 
continue or discontinue based on the values of ω and k. The client prefers to continue if the 
resulting payoff of ωQ-kR is larger than -Q+R when discontinuing, and vice versa.  
 If the GSP has chosen to downgrade the service, then the client decides to either continue or 
discontinue based on the value of ω. The client prefers to continue if the resulting payoff of -ωQ 
is larger than -Q+R when discontinuing, and vice versa. 
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Figure 6.7 Quality choice game between GSP and client in Case III, where Q>R>C>0 and 0<ω<k<1. 
 
 
Table 6.10 Strategic Form of Quality Choice Game in Case III, where Q>R>C>0 and 0<ω<k<1. 
II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
U: Cont’ 
D: Cont’ 
 
U: Cont’ 
D: Discont’ 
 
U: Discont’ 
D: Cont’ 
 
U: Discont’ 
D: Discont’ 
 
Upgrade (U) 
ωQ-kR 
kR-ωC 
ωQ-kR 
kR-ωC 
-Q+R 
-R-ωC 
-Q+R 
-R-ωC 
 
Downgrade (D) 
-ωQ 
ωC 
-Q+R 
-R+ωC  
-ωQ 
ωC 
-Q+R 
-R+ωC  
 
  
 First equilibrium, if the payoff of ωQ-kR is larger than -Q+R, then the GSP prefers to 
upgrade the service, which results in the payoff of kR-ωC. Second equilibrium, if the payoff of 
ωQ-kR is less than -Q+R and if the payoff of -ωQ is larger than -Q+R, then the GSP prefers to 
downgrade the service, which results in the payoff of ωC. Third equilibrium, if the payoff of 
ωQ-kR is less than -Q+R and if the payoff of -ωQ is less than -Q+R, then the GSP still prefers to 
downgrade the service, which results in the payoff of –R+ωC. As a result, the shaded areas in 
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Table 6.10 represent three possible Nash equilibria: (Upgrade, Continue), (Downgrade, 
Continue), and (Downgrade, Discontinue). The detail of each strategic combination is described 
in Table 6.11. 
Table 6.11 Payoff Matrix Detail for Case III. 
Choice Combination GSP Client 
 
GSP: Upgrade 
Client: Continue 
The GSP gains benefit from this 
decision since the GSP increases price 
more than the upgrade costs. 
 
The client is willing to pay high price to 
receive a better service. This decision 
decreases client’s benefit. 
GSP: Upgrade 
Client: Discontinue 
Not only the GSP loses money in 
upgrading the service, but also loses the 
client. This decision is not effective. 
 
The client does not want to pay high 
price. He/She is not satisfied with it. 
There is no benefit from this decision. 
GSP: Downgrade 
Client: Continue 
The GSP succeeds at reducing its costs 
while still earning the same revenues. 
So, the GSP gains benefit from this 
decision. 
Although the QoS is lower, the client is 
still satisfied with it. This decision 
decreases client’s benefit since the 
client has to pay the same price. 
 
GSP: Downgrade 
Client: Discontinue 
Although the GSP can reduce its costs, 
the GSP loses the existing client. The 
GSP is too greedy. So, this decision is 
not effective.  
 
The client is not willing to pay the same 
price to receive a lower QoS. There is 
no benefit from this decision. 
 
6.2.2.5. Summary of Quality Choice Games 
 
Figure 6.8 presents the summary of quality choice games in three pricing scenarios. The results 
show that there are no dominant strategies. In each case, there are up to three possible Nash 
equilibria, as presented in Table 6.12. Clearly, the equilibria depend on the value of Q and step- 
level parameters (ω and k). The client gains different benefits from deciding to continue or 
discontinue, or even indifference between those two choices. This definitely affects the GSP who 
moves earlier. As a result, the GSP has to know how the client rates its service (Q). By obtaining 
the value of Q (or value profiles), the GSP can control the value of step-level parameters to 
improve its profit. In a word, value profiles can help GSPs to optimally plan their resources.  
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Figure 6.8 Summary of quality choice games without client’s feedback, where the GSP commits to upgrade or 
downgrade, and the client can react accordingly. 
 
 
 
Table 6.12 Summary of Nash Equilibria in each Pricing Scenario. 
 
Pricing Scenario No. of Equilibria Nash Equilibria 
Flat 3 (Upgrade, Continue), (Downgrade, Continue), 
and (Downgrade, Discontinue) 
Fair 2 (Upgrade, Continue) and (Downgrade, Continue) 
Selfish 3 (Upgrade, Continue), (Downgrade, Continue), 
and (Downgrade, Discontinue) 
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6.2.3. Feedback Games 
6.2.3.1. Game Setup 
 
Table 6.13 Feedback Game Parameters, where 0 < ω < k < 1. 
 Upgrade 
(when a client receives a poor service) 
Downgrade 
(when a client receives a very good service) 
Q Q = (1+ω)*Q Q = (1-ω)*Q 
R R = (1+k)*R R =R 
C C = (1+ω)*C C = (1-ω)*C 
 
According to the second research question Q2, we play non-cooperative games to study the 
cooperation (1) for GSP vs. client and (2) for client vs. client. In these games, we assume that all 
players are rational and selfish and clients always provide feedback. Then, we assume that the 
GSP plans resources based on the received feedback. We also assume that the GSP will upgrade 
a service if the percentage of received positive feedback is lower than its preferred level (upgrade 
trigger), and vice versa. Table 6.13 summarizes parameters used in these feedback games. 
 In the GSP vs. client game, we suppose that player I is a GSP and player II is a client. The 
GSP has two resource planning strategies after receiving the client’s feedback: Trust or Don’t 
trust the feedback. Believing the feedback might result in services that are more costly to 
provision. The client also has to choose between providing Truthful and Untruthful feedback. 
The untruthful feedback gives an insincere client more benefits than truthful feedback. On the 
other hand, truthful feedback is more valuable than untruthful feedback to the GSP. A resource 
manager will disregard the client’s feedback if he/she knew that the client lied. As a result, this 
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game has four strategic combinations: (Trust, Truthful), (Trust, Untruthful), (Don’t trust, 
Truthful), and (Don’t trust, Untruthful). 
 
Table 6.14 Payoff Matrix of Feedback Game in Case IV. 
Strategic combination GSP Client 
 
GSP: Trust 
Client: Truthful 
The GSP plans resources according to the 
received feedback information. This helps 
to eliminate ideal resources.  
 
The client still receives a satisfactory 
service.  
GSP: Trust 
Client: Untruthful 
The GSP has to plan unnecessary 
resources. So, the GSP loses.  
The insincere client can consume more 
resources. The client’s benefit increases. 
 
GSP: Don’t trust 
Client: Truthful 
The GSP thinks that the client lied, so the 
GSP decides to disregard the feedback 
information. There is no benefit. 
 
The client’s feedback information is 
overlooked. There is no benefit. 
GSP: Don’t trust 
Client: Untruthful 
The GSP thinks that the client lied, so the 
GSP decides to disregard the feedback 
information. There is no benefit. 
The insincere client cannot trick the GSP. 
There is no benefit. 
 
 
In the client vs. client game, we assume that both clients do not know each other, and cannot 
communicate with each other. We also assume that clients do not have any knowledge about the 
another’s move. In this game, there are four strategic combinations: (Truthful, Truthful), 
(Truthful, Untruthful), (Untruthful, Truthful), and (Untruthful, Untruthful). 
6.2.3.2. Case IV: GSP vs. Client 
In this case, we analyze the feedback game between a GSP and a client. Table 6.14 presents the 
detail of each strategic combination. Table 6.15 analyzes the game given that the client already 
receives a very good service. On other hand, Table 6.16 analyzes the game given that the client 
receives a poor service. 
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Table 6.15 Feedback game between GSP (I) and client (II) in case IV, given that the client already receives a very 
good service and the GSP prefers to downgrade the service. 
      II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
 
Truthful 
 
Untruthful 
 
Trust -ωQ 
ωC 
ωQ-kR 
kR- ωC 
 
Don’t trust 0 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
Table 6.16 Feedback game between GSP (I) and client (II) in case IV, given that the client receives a poor service 
and the GSP prefers to upgrade the service. 
      II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
 
Truthful 
 
Untruthful 
(badly poor, b>k>ω) 
 
Trust ωQ-kR 
kR- ωC 
bQ-kR 
kR-bC 
 
Don’t trust 0 
0 
0 
0 
 
In Table 6.15-Table 6.16, “Trust” strategy dominates “Don’t trust” strategy. Since both 
players are rational, the client realizes that the GSP always prefers to trust the received feedback. 
Then, the client will provide untruthful feedback because of the higher payoff. As a result, the 
rationality of both players leads to the conclusion that the client will provide untruthful feedback 
and the GSP will trust it. At this point, the cooperation cannot emerge and the GSP requires a 
mechanism to detect the insincere client. 
6.2.3.3. Case V: Client vs. Client 
 
In this case, we analyze the feedback game between a client and a client. Table 6.17 presents the 
detail of each strategic combination. Table 6.18 analyzes the game given that they already 
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receive a good service. On other hand, Table 6.19 analyzes the game given that they already 
receive a poor service. 
Table 6.17 Payoff Matrix of Feedback Game in Case V. 
Strategic combination Clients  
 
Client (I) : Truthful  
Client (II): Truthful 
 
The aggregate feedback is helpful for the GSP, so 
the GSP gains more benefit than clients. 
Client (I) : Truthful  
Client (II): Untruthful 
 
The aggregate feedback is not strong.  
Client (I) : Untruthful  
Client (II): Truthful 
 
The aggregate feedback is not strong.  
Client (I) : Untruthful  
Client (II): Untruthful 
 
The aggregate feedback is beneficial for clients. 
 
Table 6.18 Feedback game between client (I) and client (II) in case V, given that they already receive a very good 
service and the GSP prefers to downgrade the service. 
      II (Client)                   
 
I (Client) 
 
Truthful 
 
Untruthful 
 
Truthful -ωQ 
-ωQ 
0 
0 
 
Untruthful 0 
0 
ωQ-kR 
ωQ-kR 
 
Table 6.19 Feedback game between client (I) and client (II) in case V, given that they receive a poor service and the 
GSP prefers to upgrade the service. 
      II (Client)                   
 
I (Client) 
 
Truthful 
 
Untruthful 
(badly poor, b>k>ω) 
 
Truthful ωQ-kR 
ωQ-kR 
0 
0 
 
Untruthful 0 
0 
bQ-kR  
bQ-kR 
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In Table 6.18, “Untruthful” strategy dominates “Truthful” strategy. Both clients provide 
untruthful feedback because of the higher payoff. In Table 6.19, it is a coordination game [50], 
which all Nash equilibriums exist when both players choose the same strategies. The (untruthful, 
untruthful) payoff Pareto dominates the (truthful, truthful) payoff. As a result, the rationality of 
both players leads to the conclusion that the client will provide untruthful feedback. The 
cooperation also cannot emerge at this point. 
 
6.2.4. Credibility-based Feedback Games 
6.2.4.1. Game Setup 
What makes it possible for the cooperation to emerge is that both players have to meet each other 
again, recognize each other from the past transaction, and recall how other has behaved last time 
[29]. The decision of players not only affects the outcome of this current move, but also 
influences the future decision of the players. This is called an iterated game. 
Using the credibility mechanism, the GSP checks whether the received feedback is truthful 
by comparing that with their performance record. This mechanism also allows the GSP to punish 
the insincere client for previous non-cooperative play. This is similar to “Tit for tat” strategy41 in 
game theory. Then, the cooperation might arise as an equilibrium outcome. The incentive for 
client to defect is overcome by the threat of punishment, which is leading to the possibility of a 
cooperative outcome. Consequently, we apply the credibility mechanism into feedback games. 
                                                 
41 Tit for tat is a highly effective strategy using in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. A player using this strategy will 
initially cooperate, and then respond based on another player’s previous decision. 
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6.2.4.2. Case VI: GSP vs. Client 
In this case, we analyze the credibility-based feedback game between a GSP and a client. Table 
6.20 presents the detail of each strategic combination. Table 6.21 analyzes the game given that 
the client already receives a very good service. On other hand, Table 6.22 analyzes the game 
given that the client receives a poor service.  
 
Table 6.20 Payoff Matrix of Credibility-based Feedback Game in Case VI. 
Strategic combination GSP Client 
 
GSP: Trust 
Client: Truthful 
The GSP plans resources efficiently. This 
helps to eliminate ideal resources.  
 
The client still receives a satisfactory 
service.  
GSP: Trust 
Client: Untruthful 
The GSP detects the untruthful feedback, 
and discards it.   
 
The insincere client is detected and 
penalized for some periods of time. 
GSP: Don’t trust 
Client: Truthful 
The GSP thinks that the client lied, so the 
GSP decides to disregard the feedback 
information. There is no benefit. 
 
The client’s feedback information is 
overlooked. There is no benefit. 
GSP: Don’t trust 
Client: Untruthful 
The GSP thinks that the client lied, so the 
GSP decides to disregard the feedback 
information. There is no benefit. 
 
The insincere client is detected and 
penalized for some periods of time. 
  
 
Table 6.21 Credibility-based feedback game between GSP (I) and client (II) in case VI, given that the client already 
receives a very good service and the GSP prefers to downgrade the service. 
      II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
 
Truthful 
 
Untruthful 
 
Trust -ωQ 
ωC 
-Q 
0 
 
Don’t trust 0 
0 
-Q 
0 
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Table 6.22 Credibility-based feedback game between GSP (I) and client (II) in case VI, given that the client receives 
a poor service and the GSP prefers to upgrade the service. 
      II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
 
Truthful 
 
Untruthful 
 
Trust ωQ-kR 
kR- ωC 
-Q 
0 
 
Don’t trust 0 
0 
-Q 
0 
 
In Table 6.21-Table 6.22, “Truthful” strategy dominates “Untruthful” strategy because of the 
credibility mechanism. Since both players are rational, the GSP realizes that the client is afraid of 
the punishment. Then, the client will provide truthful feedback. As a result, the rationality of 
both players leads to the conclusion that the client will provide truthful feedback and the GSP 
will trust it. The cooperation succeeds at this point.  
 
6.2.4.3. Case VII: Client vs. Client 
In this case, we analyze the credibility-based feedback game between a client and a client. Table 
6.23 presents the detail of each strategic combination. Table 6.24 analyzes the game given that 
they already receive a good service. On other hand, Table 6.25 analyzes the game given that they 
receive a poor service. 
 In Table 6.24-Table 6.25, “Truthful” strategy dominates “Untruthful” strategy because of the 
credibility mechanism. As a result, the rationality of both players leads to the conclusion that 
clients will provide truthful feedback since the (truthful, truthful) outcome yields the highest 
benefit to both clients.  The cooperation emerges at this point.  
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Table 6.23 Payoff Matrix of Credibility-based Feedback Game in Case VII. 
Strategic combination Clients  
 
Client (I) : Truthful  
Client (II): Truthful 
 
The aggregate feedback is helpful for the GSP, so the 
GSP gains more benefit than clients. 
Client (I) : Truthful  
Client (II): Untruthful 
 
The aggregate feedback is not strong. The insincere 
client is penalized.  
Client (I) : Untruthful  
Client (II): Truthful 
 
The aggregate feedback is not strong. The insincere 
client is penalized. 
Client (I) : Untruthful  
Client (II): Untruthful 
 
The aggregate feedback is discarded. Both clients are 
punished. 
 
 
Table 6.24 Credibility-based feedback game between client (I) and client (II) in case VII, given that they already 
receive a very good service and the GSP prefers to downgrade the service. 
      II (Client)                   
 
I (Client) 
 
Truthful 
 
Untruthful 
 
Truthful -ωQ 
-ωQ 
-Q 
0 
 
Untruthful 0 
-Q 
-Q 
-Q 
 
 
Table 6.25 Credibility-based feedback game between client (I) and client (II) in case VII, given that they receive a 
poor service and the GSP prefers to upgrade the service. 
      II (Client)                   
 
I (Client) 
 
Truthful 
 
Untruthful 
 
Truthful ωQ-kR 
ωQ-kR 
-Q 
0 
 
Untruthful 0 
-Q 
-Q  
-Q 
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6.2.5.  Summary 
From the quality choice games, the results clearly show that feedback information is necessary 
for optimal resource planning. With received feedback, GSPs can properly adjust the step-level 
parameters when making capital investment decisions. To do so, GSPs require feedback models 
to build a value profile for a collection of clients. However, the results show that the cooperation 
cannot emerge only through the use of feedback. Credibility mechanisms are required for 
cooperation to emerge. With the use of credibility mechanisms, the results show that clients will 
fear punishment and provide truthful feedback, and GSPs will trust it. Therefore, in this 
dissertation, we propose the use of credibility-based binary feedback to build value profiles, 
which GSPs can use to optimally plan their resources.  
 
6.3. ANALYSIS OF GSPS’ INCENTIVES 
 
GSPs do not have an incentive to advertise or show any of their weak points [17], such as 
negative feedback. In Section 6.2.3, we assumed that GSPs plan their resources based on the 
received feedback. We also assumed that they must to upgrade their service if the percentage of 
received positive feedback becomes too low. Thus, they have an economic incentive to cheat by 
disregarding negative feedback to save these upgrade costs. In this section, we play a non-
cooperative game, given that a client receives a poor service and a GSP has to upgrade the 
service.  
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Table 6.26 GSP’s Incentive Game Parameters, where 0 < ω < k < 1. 
 Upgrade 
Quality Q = (1+ω)*Q 
Revenue R = (1+k)*R 
Cost C = (1+ω)*C 
 
In this GSP vs. client game, we suppose that player I is a GSP and player II is a client. The 
GSP has two strategies after receiving the client’s feedback: Cheat or Don’t cheat. As discussed 
in Section 6.1.2, we assume that the GSP’s feedback profile is made public. Thus, the client has 
two possible strategies based on the GSP’s misbehavior: Notice or Don’t notice. We assume that 
if the client can notice that misbehavior, he/she will switch to other GSPs. As a result, this game 
has four strategy combinations: (Cheat, Notice), (Cheat, Don’t notice), (Don’t cheat, Notice), 
and (Don’t cheat, Don’t notice). Table 6.26–Table 6.27 summarize parameters used in this game 
and detail of each strategy combination, respectively.  
Table 6.27 Payoff Matrix of GSP’s Incentive Game. 
Strategic combination GSP Client 
 
GSP: Cheat 
Client: Notice 
The GSP disregards unfavorable feedback 
but the client notices it. Although the GSP 
can save the upgrade costs, it loses the 
existing client. 
 
The client notices the misbehavior of GSP, 
so he/she switches to other GSPs. 
GSP: Cheat 
Client: Don’t notice 
The GSP disregards unfavorable feedback 
and the client does not notice it. The GSP 
can save the upgrade costs without losing 
its revenues. 
 
The client does not notice the misbehavior 
of GSP. The client’s benefit decreases. 
GSP: Don’t cheat 
Client: Notice 
The GSP plans resources based on the 
received feedback. This helps to keep the 
existing client. 
 
The client still receives a satisfactory 
service. 
 
GSP: Don’t cheat 
Client: Don’t notice 
The GSP plans resources based on the 
received feedback. This helps to keep the 
existing client. 
 
The client still receives a satisfactory 
service. 
 
  
 78 
Table 6.28 GSP’s incentive game between GSP (I) and client (II).  
      II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
 
Notice 
 
Don’t notice 
 
Cheat -Q+R 
-R 
0 
0 
 
Don’t cheat ωQ-kR 
kR-ωC 
ωQ-kR 
kR-ωC 
  
 Table 6.28 shows that “Don’t cheat” strategy dominates “Cheat” strategy. Since the feedback 
profile is made public, the GSP realizes that the client can notice its misbehavior. Thus, the GSP 
will not cheat because of the higher payoff. As a result, the rationality of both players leads to the 
conclusion that the GSP will cooperate with clients.  
 
6.4. THE EFFECT OF UNTRUTHFUL FEEDBACK 
 
This chapter investigates the issues in using the credibility-based binary feedback model. We 
have explored GSPs’ incentives and clients’ incentives to cooperate and to be truthful. According 
to the game analyses, GSPs are better off not cheating by disregarding unfavorable feedback 
since their feedback profile is made public. Also, clients are better off cooperating with GSPs 
because of the use of credibility mechanism. However, the model cannot filter all untruthful 
feedback because of limited information received from clients. Thus, non-cooperative and 
untruthful clients still occur in two cases, as summarized in Table 6.29. 
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Table 6.29 The Effect of Untruthful Feedback. 
Client 
Satisfaction 
Expected 
Feedback 
Received 
Feedback  
 
Analysis Detection  Note 
(1) Sj ≥ 0 “+” “No rate” Non-cooperative / 
Untruthful 
 
No. This will affect 
value profiles and client 
satisfaction rates. 
 
See Section 
7.2.1. 
(2) λj ≤ Sj < 0 “No rate” “-” Untruthful 
 
No. This will affect 
client satisfaction rates. 
 
See Sections 
7.2.2, 7.2.4, and 
7.3. 
 
 
In the first case, although GSPs finish jobs within preferred durations and budgets, clients 
might not response because of noncooperation or being untruthful. In the second case, when 
GSPs slightly fail to meet clients’ requirement, untruthful clients will provide negative feedback 
instead of no response. These two cases will affect value profiles and client satisfaction rates (or 
percentage of positive feedback) and might cause GSPs’ investment decision to change.  
  
Table 6.30 Parameters for Sensitivity Analysis of Untruthful Feedback 
 Parameters Values 
ENVIRONMENT NUM_CLIENTS 
Interarrival rate 
Service rate 
1000 
1.0 jobs/min 
1.0 jobs/min 
CLIENT AGENTS 
 
Budget 
Preferred duration 
No_of_Jobs 
αj 
tretransmit 
Uniform (1, 20) 
Uniform (1, 15) 
Uniform (10, 50) 
1 
1000 min 
GSP AGENTS pi 
ai 
bi 
tpenalty 
Vary based on system utilization 
0 
0.1 
1000 min 
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 Thus, we perform a sensitivity analysis of untruthful feedback by varying P(contribution), 
P(untruthful), and clients’ QoS threshold. Then, we record the change of percentage of positive 
feedback. Table 6.30-Table 6.31 summarize parameters used in this analysis and the value of 
factors used in this full factorial design with 50 replications, respectively. 
 In this experiment, after a service, each client provides binary feedback FBj based on the 
value of his/her satisfaction, which is expressed as (see Table 5.2 for the summary of notations 
and parameters of client agents) 
€ 
FBj =
"1" if S j ≥ 0 with P(contribution)
"no rate" if S j ≥ 0 with 1− P(contribution)
"0" if S j ≤ −λ j with P(contribution)
"no rate" if S j ≤ −λ j with 1− P(contribution)
"no rate" if − λ j < S j < 0 with 1− P(untruthful)
"0" if − λ j < S j < 0 with P(untruthful)
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(6.7) 
 
Figure 6.9 illustrates the results of sensitivity analysis of untruthful feedback. These three-
dimension area graphs present the differences in percentage of positive feedback when the values 
of P(untruthful) change42. The results show that P(untruthful) affects percentage of positive 
feedback, which causes an accuracy of client satisfaction rate to decrease up to 24% and 32%, as 
shown in Figure 6.9(a) and Figure 6.9(b), respectively. In Chapter 7, we will examine whether 
untruthful feedback affects GSPs’ investment decision. 
 
 
                                                 
42 When P(untruthful) = 0, clients will not provide any untruthful feedback. When P(untruthful) = 0.6, the 
probability that clients will provide untruthful feedback is 0.6. When P(untruthful) = 1, clients will always provide 
untruthful feedback. 
(a) 
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Table 6.31 Full Factorial Design for Sensitivity Analysis of Untruthful Feedback 
Factors Levels 
P (contribution) {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0}  
P (untruthful) {0, 0.6, 1} 
Clients’ QoS threshold {0, -0.5, -1.0, -1.5, -2.0} 
# of experiments  
 
 
 
Figure 6.9 The changes of percentage of positive feedback.  
! 
5 " 3" 5 " 50 = 3,750
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7. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
This chapter presents the results and discussions of the use of credibility-based binary feedback 
model for grid resource planning according to the research questions Q4 and Q5. An economic 
equilibrium is required to test these questions. This equilibrium point can be determined by the 
intersection of cost function and market demand. Therefore, we have to construct a resource cost 
function and a proxy for market demand. First, Section 7.1 describes the resource cost function, 
the market demand proxy, and the parameter setup required in the experiments. Next, Section 7.2 
discusses the benefits of value profiles on different aspects as outlined in research questions Q4-
Q5. Lastly, Section 7.3-Section 7.4 discuss the limitations of the results and the model 
implementation, respectively. 
 
7.1. MODEL SETUP 
 
7.1.1. Resource Cost Function 
Resource optimization requires both demand and cost information. Therefore, we have to 
construct a resource cost function. In this dissertation, GSPs might decide either to upgrade or to 
downgrade their computing capacity based on client demand. Since the lifetime of investments in 
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computing resources is substantially longer than demand fluctuations, the long run cost must be 
used for the cost function.  
 To generate a cost function, we begin by selecting six server systems from the TPC-C 
Benchmark43, as shown in Table 7.1. In this dissertation, we assume that these six server systems 
represent six different scales of GSPs measured by the number of processors per GSP. Then, we 
determine a long-run average total cost (LATC) for one year, which is the sum of short run 
average total cost (SATC) of each GSP. The SATCi can be calculated as 
€ 
SATCi =
TCOi + network costi + operation costi
no. of job productioni
 (7.1) 
where the total cost of ownership (TCOi) is 
€ 
TCOi = hardware costi + storage costi + software costi  (7.2) 
 
Table 7.1 Server Cost of Ownership44, as of Feb. 17, 2008, Modified from TPC-C Benchmark [58]. 
GSPi System tpmC 
(transactions/minute) 
3-yr Cost of 
Ownership 
System 
Availability 
GSP1 IBM System p5 570 4P c/s 236,271 $571,388 04/04/08 
GSP2 IBM System p 570 404,462 $1,335,739 11/26/07 
GSP3 IBM System x3950 M2 841,809 $2,817,186 04/01/08 
GSP4 NEC Express5800/1320Xf (16p/32c) 1,245,516 $4,874,853 04/30/08 
GSP5 BULL Escala PL1660R 1,616,162 $5,386,171 12/16/07 
GSP6 FUJITSU PRIMEQUEST 580 32p/64c 2,196,268 $9,413,014 04/30/08 
 
 By assuming that each job has 106 transactions, Table 7.2 shows the one-year cost analysis45 
of each GSP, which we calculated from Table 7.1. After running the regression model, Figure 
7.1 shows the LATC curve, which can be expressed as  
                                                 
43 The TPC-C Benchmark simulates a complete computing environment where clients execute transactions against a 
database. The TPC-C is measured in transactions per minute (tpmC). See http://www.tpc.org.  
44 See Appendix A. 
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€ 
LATC = 3.59 + −0.003( ) no.of jobs( ) + 1.817∗10−6( ) no.of jobs( )2 (7.3) 
   
Table 7.2 One-Year Cost Analysis of each GSP. 
GSPi Service Rate 
(Job/Min) 
No. of Job Production 
(x1000) 
1-yr Cost of Ownership 
(x1000) 
GSP1 0.24 122 $190 
GSP2 0.40 210 $445 
GSP3 0.84 436 $939 
GSP4 1.25 646 $1,625 
GSP5 1.62 838 $1,795 
GSP6 2.20 1,139 $3,138 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 The long-run average total cost (LATC) curve of cost function, where the dashed lines are the minimum 
ATC of each system. 
                                                                                                                                                             
45 As the TPC provides three-year cost of ownership analysis of each server, we simplify our cost function by 
dividing into one-year cost analysis. 
 85 
Table 7.3 The statistical summary of Quadratic cost function. 
 
 
 
As shown in Table 7.3, the statistical summary indicates that this cost function has a high 
coefficient of determination (R2=0.811) and a low significance level (Sig.=0.082). In other 
words, this cost function fits the data at 81.1% and the confidence interval of this cost function is 
92%. 
 
7.1.2. Market Demand 
We showed earlier that a value profile could function as a proxy for a demand function of an 
individual GSP, so the sum of each value profile can be used as a proxy for market demand. By 
assuming that all value profiles are published, market demand can be expressed as46 
€ 
Market Demand = value_ profilei( )
i=1
#GSPs
∑  
(7.4) 
                                                 
46 We will justify this concept in the next section.  
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In this dissertation, we use this market demand proxy to represent all grid clients’ 
willingness-to-pay. Furthermore, as we assume that the market is a perfectly competitive market, 
normal profits only arise when GSP’s long-run economic equilibrium is reached. Thus, with the 
use of value profiles, the economic equilibrium can be determined by the intersection of the 
proxy for market demand and the LATC. 
 
7.1.3. Experiment Setup 
In the experiments, we assume that each client always provides feedback FBj based on the value 
of satisfaction level Sj that can be expressed as (see Table 5.2 for the summary of notations and 
parameters of client agents) 
€ 
€ 
FBj =
"1" if S j ≥ 0 with P(contribution)
"no rate" if S j ≥ 0 with (1− P(contribution))
"0" if S j ≤ −λ j with P(contribution)
"no rate" if S j ≤ −λ j with (1− P(contribution))
"no rate" if − λ j < S j < 0 with (1− P(untruthful))
"0" if − λ j < S j < 0 with P(untruthful)
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(7.5) 
We believe that GSPs can increase clients’ incentives to cooperate, as discussed in Section 6.1.2. 
Thus, in this dissertation, we assume that clients always provide feedback. Table 7.4 summarizes 
the default values of parameters for the experiments. 
In this dissertation, we consider two cases: a low demand case and a high demand case. In 
market case I, the high-capacity GSP might want to downsize because of low demand. In market 
case II, the low-capacity GSP might want to upgrade because of high demand. These two cases 
frequently arise when making capital investment decisions. Table 7.5 presents the design of these 
experiments. 
 
 87 
Table 7.4 Model Parameters 
 Parameters Values 
ENVIRONMENT TIME 518400 min (1 year) 
CLIENT AGENTS 
 
Budget 
Preferred duration 
No_of_Jobs 
λj (QoS threshold) 
αj 
tretransmit 
P(contribution) 
Uniform (5, 100) 
Uniform (5, 30) 
Uniform (10, 100) 
Uniform (-2, 0) 
1.0 
1000 min 
1.0 
GSP AGENTS pi 
ai 
bi 
tpenalty 
Vary based on system utilization 
0 
0.1 
1000 min 
  
 
Table 7.5 Full Factorial Design for Research Questions Q4-Q5 
Factors Levels 
Job Load • Low demand (Market Case I) 
o NUM_CLIENTS = 5,000 
o Interarrival rate = 0.3 job/min 
• High demand (Market Case II) 
o NUM_CLIENTS = 50,000 
o Interarrival rate = 0.5 job/min 
Service Rate (job/min) {0.24, 0.40, 0.84, 1.25, 1.62, 2.20} 
P (untruthful) {0, 1.0} 
Note: See Table 7.4 for other parameters. 
 
Before starting the experiments, we have to justify the concept of market demand. From 
Table 7.5, Figure 7.2 presents the market demand curves calculated from the horizontal sum of 
value profile of each GSP in each price range. For example, in Figure 7.2(b), at the price is equal 
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to 0.4, the sum of six value profiles is 95547. According to the concept of market demand in 
Section 7.1.2, this number can be used as a proxy for market demand at that price. In this 
dissertation, we will use this proxy for the market demand that represents clients’ willingness-to-
pay for grid resources.  
 
 
Figure 7.2 Market demand of GSPs (a) low-demand case and (b) hi-demand case. 
 
                                                 
47The horizontal sum of six value profiles is 16.5+49+100+129+276.5+384 = 955. 
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Furthermore, we assume that when any GSP decides to change its resource base in response 
to market demand, other GSPs will not change their resource base. This assumption allows us to 
concentrate on whether the use of value profiles provides a benefit to a GSP. 
 
7.2. BENEFITS OF VALUE PROFILES 
 
The goal of this section is to demonstrate how value profiles benefit both GSPs and clients, 
which are the research questions Q4-Q5. From the GSPs’ perspective, we study the effect of the 
use of value profiles on profit, resource usage, and percentage of positive feedback or client 
satisfaction rate. From the clients’ perspective, we examine job success rate.  
 
7.2.1. Case I: Low Demand with Truthful Feedback 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Market equilibrium in Case I, given that market demand is equal to marginal revenue. 
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In this case, we present the case where GSP6 considers downgrading its computing capacity 
because of low demand. Without value profiles, GSP6 produces 274,711 jobs/year and its 
revenue is below the LATC curve. This means that GSP6 loses approximately $5,494, as shown 
in the shaded area in Figure 7.3. 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Summary of the tradeoffs when using value profiles in Case I: (a) System utilization, (b) Percentage of 
positive feedback, (c) Clients’ job success rate, and (d) Tradeoffs when downsizing the computing capacity from 
system 6 to system 2. 
 
With value profiles, as shown in Figure 7.3, GSP6 will profit by reducing its service rate from 
2.2 to 0.4 jobs/min since the equilibrium point is close to GSP2. Figure 7.4 summarizes the 
tradeoffs after downgrading to the same capacity as GSP2. The results clearly show that system 
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utilization significantly increases from 45.7% to 82.5%. However, the percentage of positive 
feedback decreases from 99.4% to 94.8%. Clients’ job success rate also decreases from 99.3% to 
92.5%. Clearly, there are tradeoffs when using value profiles, as shown in Figure 7.4(d). While 
system utilization increases by 36.8% percentage points, percentage of positive feedback and 
clients’ job success rate decreases by 4.6% and 6.8% percentage points, respectively.  
 
Table 7.6 Paired t-Test on the Mean of Dependent Variables when Using Value Profiles in Case I, where Pair 1, Pair 
2, and Pair 3 are the t_Test on %pos_fbi, ρi, and %jobsuccess, j , respectively. 
 
 
 To conduct the statistical testing on Q4.2-Q5.1, we perform the paired t-test on the mean of 
dependent variables, which are ρi, %pos_fbi,, and %jobsuccess, j. Table 7.6 presents the difference 
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in mean performance when using value profiles. The result shows that 
€ 
ρ6
with _ value _ profiles  has the 
significant higher mean than 
€ 
ρ6
without _ value _ profiles, which is consistent with what is hypothesized in 
Q4.2 (
€ 
ρ6
with _ value _ profiles > ρ6
without _ value _ profiles). However, the result indicates that 
€ 
%pos_ fb6with _ value _ profiles and 
€ 
% jobsuccess,6with _ value _ profiles have lower mean than 
€ 
%pos_ fb6without _ value _ profiles  
and 
€ 
% jobsuccess,6without _ value _ profiles, respectively. These reject what are hypothesized in Q4.3-Q5.1. In 
summary, the use of value profiles benefits GSP6 in resource cost saving even though client 
satisfaction rate decreases slightly (but still over 90%). 
 Since clients are worse off in this case, they might not want to cooperate with GSP6 or even 
provide untruthful feedback. This will cause the market demand curve and the equilibrium point 
to change. To investigate this situation, we change the values of P(contribution) and 
P(untruthful) in Table 7.4. In this experiment, each client is assigned with different values of 
probabilities, as summarized in Table 7.7. Then, we observe the change of results. 
 
Table 7.7 Changes of Model Parameters 
 Parameters Values 
CLIENT AGENTS P(contribution) 
P(untruthful) 
Uniform (0, 100) 
Uniform (0, 100) 
Note: See Table 7.4-Table 7.5 for other parameters. 
  
 As explained in Section 6.1.4, GSPs detect untruthful feedback by comparing the received 
feedback with their expected feedback record. When using mechanism, GSPs expect to receive 
positive feedback if they can finish a job within a preferred duration48. Thus, this expected 
                                                 
48 See Equation (6.1).  
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positive feedback can be used as the reference market demand curve when clients are always 
cooperative, P(contribution) = 1, and truthful, P(untruthful) = 0.  
 With non-cooperative and untruthful clients, the received market demand curve shifts down 
and to the left, as shown in Figure 7.5. The result shows that the received and reference 
equilibrium points are close to GSP1 and GSP2, respectively. With the received demand 
information, GSP6 will downsize to the same capacity as GSP1 instead of GSP2. In other words, 
GSP6 will reduce its service rate from 2.2 to 0.24 jobs/min, which is 1.96 jobs/min decrement. If 
clients are cooperative, GSP6 will reduce the rate to 0.4 jobs/min, which is 1.8 jobs/min 
decrement. However, if clients are non-cooperative and untruthful, clients will experience more 
delays in the system, which is 0.16 jobs/min increment. In short, clients are better off 
cooperating with GSP6. 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Changes of market demand curve and equilibrium point in Case I. 
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 Furthermore, we play a non-cooperative game between GSP vs. client to investigate the 
development of cooperation for this situation. We suppose that player I is a GSP and player II is 
a client. Both players have two strategies: Cooperate or Defect. As a result, this game has four 
strategy combinations: (Cooperate, Cooperate), (Cooperate, Defect), (Defect, Cooperate), and 
(Defect, Defect). Table 7.8-Table 7.9 summarize parameters used in this game and detail of each 
strategy combination, respectively.  
 
Table 7.8 Client’s Incentive Game Parameters, where 0 < ω < k < 1. 
 Downgrade 
Quality Q = (1-ω)*Q 
Revenue R = R 
Cost C = (1-ω)*C 
 
 
Table 7.9 Payoff Matrix of Client’s Incentive Game. 
Strategic combination GSP Client 
 
GSP: Cooperate 
Client: Cooperate 
The GSP can eliminate ideal resources. 
So, the GSP saves some costs. 
 
The client is worse off. The client’s benefit 
decreases but still better than defecting. 
GSP: Cooperate 
Client: Defect 
 
The GSP reduces its resources lower than 
the client demand (short supply).   
Because of short supply, the client will 
experience high delays. So, the client’s 
benefit decreases. 
 
GSP: Defect 
Client: Cooperate 
 
There is no benefit. There is no benefit. 
GSP: Defect 
Client: Defect 
 
There is no benefit. There is no benefit. 
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Table 7.10 Client’s incentive game between GSP (I) and client (II).  
      II (Client)                   
 
I (GSP) 
 
Cooperate 
 
Defect 
 
Cooperate -ωQ 
ωC 
-kQ 
kC 
 
Defect 0 
0 
0 
0 
 
 From Table 7.10, the resulting payoff of -ωQ when cooperating is larger than –kQ when 
defecting. As a result, clients will cooperate with GSP6 (the cooperation will emerge). 
 
7.2.2. Case II: Low Demand with Untruthful Feedback 
According to Section 6.4, untruthful feedback causes the accuracy of percentage of positive 
feedback to decrease. In this case, we examine whether untruthful feedback affects GSP6’s 
decision in case I. 
  
 
Figure 7.6 Percentage of positive feedback comparing between Case II and I. 
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 With truthful feedback in case I, positive feedback decreases slightly by 4.6% percentage 
points after GSP6 downsizes its computing capacity to the same as GSP2. However, with 
untruthful feedback in this case, positive feedback decreases from 97.5% to 85.6%, which is 
11.9% decrement in percentage points as presented in Figure 7.6(b). According to the statistical 
testing in Table 7.11, untruthful feedback reduces the accuracy of positive feedback by 7.36% 
percentage points.  
   
Table 7.11 Paired t-Test on the Mean of Percentage of Positive Feedback Comparing between Case II and I. 
 
 
If GSP6 can live with this untruthful client satisfaction rate, it will continue using this 
computing capacity (GSP2). On the other hand, if GSP6 prefers to keep its client satisfaction rate 
over 90%, it might decide to upgrade its computing capacity to the same as GSP3. However, 
GSP6 will end up with losses since revenue of GSP3 is below the LATC curve, as presented in 
P(untruthful)=0 - P(untruthful)=1
P(untruthful)=0 - P(untruthful)=1
P(untruthful)=0 - P(untruthful)=1
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Figure 7.3. As the consequence, this would not happen because GSP6 has to have a profit. Thus, 
GSP6 will not change its decision. In short, untruthful feedback does not affect the investment 
decision of GSP6 in this case. 
 
7.2.3. Case III: High Demand with Truthful Feedback 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Market equilibrium in Case III, given that market demand is equal to marginal revenue. 
 
In the high demand case, we examine whether GSP2 should upgrade its computing capacity to 
generate more revenues. Without value profiles, GSP2 produces 186,758 jobs/year and its 
revenue is clearly over the LATC curve. This means that GSP2 has a super normal profit, as 
shown in the shaded area in Figure 7.7. Note that when a firm has a super normal profit, it 
attracts new entrants to the industry. On the other hand, when a firm has a normal profit, new 
players have a lower incentive to enter a competitive market. By increasing its capacity to 
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produce more jobs at lower cost, a GSP would achieve economies of scale and reduce the entry 
incentive. Thus, GSP2 must increase its service rate from 0.4 to 1.62 jobs/min since the 
equilibrium point is close to GSP5, as shown in Figure 7.7. 
 
 
Figure 7.8 Summary of the tradeoffs when using value profiles in Case III: (a) System utilization, (b) Percentage of 
positive feedback, (c) Clients’ job success rate, and (d) Tradeoffs when upgrading the computing capacity from 
system 2 to system 5. 
 
Figure 7.8 summarizes tradeoffs involved. After upgrading to the same capacity as GSP5, 
system utilization increases from 87% to 92.6%, and percentage of positive feedback goes up 
from 86.1% to 97.2%. Moreover, clients’ job success rate significantly improves from 82.9% to 
96.6%. As a consequence, there is no tradeoff in this case, as shown in Figure 7.8(d). The results 
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visibly show that system utilization, percentage of positive feedback, and clients’ job success 
rate increase by 5.6%, 11.1%, and 13.7% percentage points, respectively.  
 
Table 7.12 Paired t-Test on the Mean of Dependent Variables when Using Value Profiles in Case III, where Pair 1, 
Pair 2, and Pair 3 are the t_Test on %pos_fbi, ρi, and %jobsuccess, j , respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 7.12 presents the difference in mean performance when using value profiles. The result 
shows that 
€ 
ρ2
with _ value _ profiles, 
€ 
%pos_ fb2with _ value _ profiles, and 
€ 
% jobsuccess,2with _ value _ profiles have the significant 
higher mean than 
€ 
ρ2
without _ value _ profiles, 
€ 
%pos_ fb2without _ value _ profiles, and 
€ 
% jobsuccess,2without _ value _ profiles, 
respectively. These accept what are hypothesized in Q4.3-Q5.1, which are 
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€ 
ρ2
with _ value _ profiles > ρ2
without _ value _ profiles, 
€ 
%pos_ fb2with _ value _ profiles >%pos_ fb2without _ value _ profiles, and 
€ 
% jobsuccess,2with _ value _ profiles >% jobsuccess,2without _ value _ profiles. 
In summary, the use of value profiles provides benefits to GSP2 both in terms of revenue and 
client satisfaction rate. Likewise, clients receive the benefit from the use of value profiles since 
their job success rate goes up. 
 
7.2.4. Case IV: High Demand with Untruthful Feedback 
Like in Section 7.2.2, the purpose of this case is to determine whether untruthful feedback affects 
GSP2’s investment decision in case III. With truthful feedback in case III, positive feedback 
increases by 11.1% percentage points after GSP2 upgrades its computing capacity to the same as 
GSP5. With untruthful feedback in this case, positive feedback increases from 70.2% to 90.6%, 
which is 20.4% increment in percentage points as presented in Figure 7.9(b). According to the 
statistical testing in Table 7.13, untruthful feedback significantly inflates the accuracy of positive 
feedback by 9.18% percentage points. 
 
 
Figure 7.9 Percentage of positive feedback comparing between Case IV and III. 
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As this untruthful client satisfaction rate is around 90%, GSP2 will continue using this 
computing capacity (GSP5). Unless GSP2 requires client satisfaction rate to be 95%, it might 
decide to upgrade its computing capacity to the same as GSP6. To do so, GSP2 will lose since 
revenue of GSP6 is below the LATC curve, as presented in Figure 7.7. In reality, this would not 
happen because GSP2 has to have a profit. Thus, GSP2 will not change its decision. In short, 
untruthful feedback does not affect GSP2’s investment decision in this case. 
 
 
Table 7.13 Paired t-Test on the Mean of Percentage of Positive Feedback Comparing between Case IV and III. 
 
 
P(untruthful)=0 - P(untruthful)=1
P(untruthful)=0 - P(untruthful)=1
P(untruthful)=0 - P(untruthful)=1
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7.3. LIMITATIONS OF RESULTS 
 
The limitations of results from the use of credibility-based binary feedback model arise from the 
value profile construction approach in Chapter 5. Given those cooperative clients, the results are 
conditional upon this assumption. This section discusses three main issues that directly affect the 
experimental results.  
First, we assume that clients always cooperate with GSPs. Although we study clients’ 
incentives to cooperate in Section 6.1.2, it is still difficult to guarantee that clients will always 
cooperate. As discussed in Section 6.1.1, the result shows that a low P(contribution) affects the 
precision of value profiles, which can lead to an erroneous equilibrium point. In the analysis of 
research questions Q4-Q5 in Section 7.2, the equilibrium point has to be precise to help GSPs 
optimize their long run resource investment and allow us to examine the tradeoffs when using 
value profiles.  
 Second, from Table 6.16 and Table 6.29, we conclude that clients will always provide 
untruthful feedback and there are two cases that the model cannot filter out untruthful feedback. 
Moreover, as described in Section 6.4, untruthful feedback might affect GSPs’ investment 
decision. Therefore, GSPs might use a mechanism to calibrate the received client satisfaction 
rate caused by the clients’ misbehavior. 
 As described in Section 6.1.4 and Section 7.2.1, GSPs record the expected positive 
feedback49. This record can be used as the upper bound of client satisfaction rate when clients are 
always truthful, P(untruthful) = 0. Thus, the real rate would be the value between the upper 
                                                 
49 GSPs expect to receive positive feedback if they can finish a job within a preferred duration, as described in 
Equation (6.1). 
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bound and the received rate. To estimate the real rate, for example, GSPs might use the average 
value between the upper bound and the received rate as the reference rate.  
 In case II, after GSP6 downsizes its computing capacity to the same as GSP2, the received 
client satisfaction rate is 85.6%. If GSP6 prefers this rate to be over 90%, this received rate might 
lead to an inaccurate capital investment decision. By calibrating the received rate, the reference 
rate is 90.2%, as shown in Figure 7.10. Since the rate is over 90%, GSP6 will be satisfied and not 
change its decision. In short, calibrating the received rate can assist GSPs making an accurate 
capital investment decision. 
 
Figure 7.10 Reference client satisfaction rate, in Case II. 
   
Like purchasing airline tickets, we have assumed that prices are fixed after GSPs and clients 
have an agreement. Now, we will relax this simplifying assumption with variable prices. Like 
international phone calls50, GSPs will calculate actual costs based on an actual resource usage. 
To explore this issue, we repeat the experiments in Cases I and II. Then, we observe the change 
of results. 
                                                 
50 For international phone call, we know the exact rate, but when start calling, we do not know how much the total 
costs are. 
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In this experiment, prices are calculated based on the total time taken from entering a system 
until a job is completed 
€ 
t jtotal _ computing , which is equivalent to the mean response time of system. 
As we have assumed M/M/1, 
€ 
t jtotal _ computing  is expressed as 
€ 
t jtotal _ computing ~ 1µi
 
 
  
 
 1(1− ρi)
 
 
  
 
  (7.6) 
Next, we transform it into the term of ρi, which is expressed as  
€ 
ρi =
µi ∗ t jtotal _ computing −1
µi ∗ t jtotal _ computing
 
(7.7) 
Then, by substituting Equation (7.7) into Equation (5.1), we can express as 
€ 
p jactual = ai + bi ∗ µi ∗ t jtotal _ computing −1  (7.8) 
 
 
Table 7.14 Change of Model Parameters for Variable Pricing 
 Parameters Values 
CLIENT AGENTS αj Uniform (0, 100) 
Note: See Table 7.4-Table 7.5 for other parameters. 
 
 
We change the constraint sensitivity of each client αj, as summarized in Table 7.14. In Figure 
7.11, in case I, the result shows that the difference of market demand curves for variable prices 
and for fixed prices is very minor. Their market equilibrium points are the same, which is close 
to GSP2. Figure 7.12 also presents the comparison of tradeoffs between these two pricing 
scenarios. The results show that the differences are small. However, clients prefer fixed prices to 
variables prices, as shown in Figure 7.12 (b). 
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Figure 7.11 Market equilibrium in Case I, comparing between variable prices and fixed prices. 
 
 
Figure 7.12 Summary of the tradeoffs when using value profiles in Case I, comparing between variable prices and 
fixed prices. 
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Figure 7.13 Changes of percentage of positive feedback in Case II, comparing between variable prices and fixed 
prices, (a) percentage of positive feedback and (b) the differences of percentage of positive feedback when 
P(untruthful)=1 and when P(untruthful)=0. 
 
 Figure 7.13, in case II, presents the comparison of percentage of positive feedback (or client 
satisfaction rate) between two pricing scenarios. In Figure 7.13(b), the result shows the 
difference of percentage of positive feedback when P(untruthful)=1 and when P(untruthful)=0. 
 107 
The result also shows that untruthful feedback has more effect on variable prices. However, 
GSPs can diminish this effect by using the reference rate, as discussed earlier in this section51.  
 
7.4. MODEL IMPLEMENTATIONS 
 
In this dissertation, we use the Demandware architecture52 to illustrate the implementation of 
credibility-based binary feedback model for grid resource planning, as shown in Figure 7.14. By 
leveraging a grid computing architecture, Demandware can dynamically increase or decrease the 
share of computing capacity assigned to each client’s requirement. This is to ensure that clients 
always have the computing capacity they need when they need it without paying for excess 
capacity up front [59]. Nevertheless, Demandware does not concentrate on its resource pool. To 
operate efficiently, Demandware has to have adequate resources to supply on-demand services as 
promised. Another concern is client satisfaction. Demandware does not ensure that clients are 
satisfied with received on-demand services in terms of QoS and cost. As a result, Demandware 
requires a mechanism to determine how clients value its service. With this information, 
Demandware can create a value profile to scale its resource pool to maximize its profit.  
 By employing the credibility-based binary feedback model into the Demandware 
architecture, it can scale its resource pool with client demand, as shown in Figure 7.14. From our 
recommendation, it requires grid feedback from e-commerce sites. Generally, e-commerce sites 
prefer to have sufficient computing capacities within their budget to satisfy their end users. Thus, 
                                                 
51 See Figure 7.10. 
52Demandware is the leading on-demand e-commerce platform that offers the most powerful online merchandising 
and marketing tools with total control over the shopping experience. The Demandware architecture is based on a 
patented grid computing technology that delivers capacity as needed for performance, scalability, and reliability 
[60]. For our case, Demandware operates as a GSP while e-commerce sites act as grid clients. See 
http://www.demandware.com/ 
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e-commerce sites provide feedback based on on-demand service satisfaction and end users’ 
feedback, as presented in Figure 7.15. This feedback represents how e-commerce sites value the 
received on-demand service from Demandware and how end users value the received service 
from e-commerce sites. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.14 The model implementation based on the Demandware architecture [61]. 
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Figure 7.15 Grid feedback structure. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.16 Grid resource planning process. 
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Given cooperative e-commerce sites and end users, they provide Demandware binary 
feedback based on their satisfaction. After verifying the feedback by filtering out untruthful 
feedback, Demandware has a value profile that can be used as a proxy for the demand from grid 
clients. With the value profile, the resource-planning assistant can determine an economic 
equilibrium point to scale its resource pool. As this process continues recursively, Demandware 
will have the right size of resource pool to provide on-demand services to its clients. Therefore, 
the value profile could help Demandware optimize their long run resource investment. Figure 
7.16 summarizes the grid resource planning process. 
 
 
 111 
 
 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
As the goal of GSPs is to improve their economic viability by maintaining the least possible set 
of resources to meet client demand, they have to know how clients value their services. The main 
objective of this dissertation is to develop an approach to build a value profile using feedback 
models for a collection of grid clients so that GSPs can use the value profile to economically 
plan their resources. We provide a comprehensive review of grid resource management systems 
and grid resource allocation approaches in Chapter 2. Most studies concentrate on building 
market-based resource allocation, providing incentives to resource owners to contribute 
resources, motivating resource users to trade-off between budget and preferred duration, and 
investigating the efficiency of different market-based resource allocation in different aspects. 
However, none of them concentrates on the use of service value to grid clients. Therefore, we 
provide theoretical frameworks that can be used to construct a useful value profile in Chapter 4. 
In this dissertation, we propose the use of binary feedback model to build a value profile. 
After a service, clients are allowed to rate GSPs based on their satisfaction. According to 
research question Q1, the following summarizes the finding of results in Chapter 5. 
• The binary feedback can be used to construct a value profile that can serve as a proxy for a 
demand function.  
• The value profile can represent client’s willingness-to-pay for grid resources at different 
prices. 
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As a contribution, we examine issues necessary to be addressed when using binary feedback 
for a collection of clients in Chapter 6. One of the main concerns is feedback contributions. In 
reality, clients do not directly benefit from their contributions, while GSPs benefit more directly. 
With the use of individual effort model, we explain how to encourage feedback contributions. 
Furthermore, clients have incentives to provide untruthful feedback to consume as many 
resources as possible. We propose the use of credibility mechanisms to detect untruthful 
feedback and penalize insincere or biased clients. We also propose the use of game theory to 
study how the cooperation can emerge. The results in Chapter 6 show that the credibility 
mechanism can help the cooperation to emerge. The followings summarize the findings from 
game theory according to research questions Q2-Q3. 
• Clients do not have incentives to be truthful because they receive more benefits when 
providing untruthful feedback. They want to receive a better service even though they are 
already satisfied with the current service. 
• The credibility mechanism can be used to encourage clients to be truthful because it ensures 
that sincere clients always receive more benefits than insincere clients. This mechanism is 
definitely required for the cooperation to emerge.  
• Furthermore, GSPs do not have an incentive to cheat and disregard unfavorable feedback 
since their feedback profiles are made public. 
 As the main contribution of this dissertation, we use the credibility-based binary feedback 
model to construct value profiles for grid resource planning. In Chapter 7, we experiment 
whether value profiles benefit GSPs and clients in the low demand case and the high demand 
case. The results show that the use of value profiles can assist GSPs in finding an economic 
equilibrium point to plan their resources. Such benefit would help to optimize their long run 
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resource investment. The followings summarize the findings of statistical testing regarding to 
research questions Q4-Q5. 
• In the low demand case, the use of value profiles assists GSPs to decrease their resource 
base. When using value profiles, 
o GSPs have a normal profit. 
o The number of idle resources decreases significantly. 
o Client satisfaction rate decreases slightly. 
o Clients’ job success rate decreases slightly. 
o Although clients are worse off in this case, they are still better off cooperating with 
GSPs to avoid more delays added into systems when defecting. 
• In the high demand case, the use of value profiles assists GSPs to increase their resource 
base. When using value profiles, 
o GSPs can achieve economies of scale. 
o The number of idle resources decreases. 
o Client satisfaction rate increases significantly. 
o Clients’ job success rate increases significantly. 
 As clients always provide untruthful feedback and there are some cases that the model cannot 
filter untruthful feedback, we assert that a feasible way to calibrate client satisfaction rate is to 
use GSPs’ expected positive feedback as the upper bound rate. This helps GSPs to estimate the 
real rate, which is the value between the upper bound and the received rate. The estimated real 
rate can be used as a reference client satisfaction rate for GSPs when making a capital investment 
decision. 
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 We also introduce the model implementation over the Demandware architecture in Chapter 
7. As the implementation costs are low, we believe that the use of credibility-based binary 
feedback can help Demandware optimize their long run resource investment.  
 
The following summarizes the contributions of this dissertation. 
• I build the service satisfaction function in terms of the change in computing time and the 
change in computing cost. This function allows heterogeneous grid clients to express 
whether they are satisfied with the received service. 
• As the main contribution, I use binary feedback as the framework to build a value profile, 
which can be used as a proxy for a demand function. This proxy can represent clients’ 
willingness-to-pay for grid resources. 
• In order to study cooperation and trust between GSPs and clients, I build the exponential-
decay value function that represents the QoS that the client received from the GSP. In this 
function, the client’s perceived value is proportional to the difference between preferred 
duration and total computing time. The longer the total computing time, the less the 
client’s perceived value will be. 
• Another key contribution is that I provide credibility-based binary feedback model to 
filter out untruthful feedback. The summation of resulting value profiles can be used as a 
proxy for market demand. This proxy can assist GSPs to find an economic equilibrium 
point to scale their resource pool. Therefore, this model helps GSPs optimally plan their 
resources and optimize their profits. 
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 The followings discuss the possibility of extending the credibility-based binary feedback 
model for grid resource planning.  
• The experiments on the model are currently simplified by ignoring the role of resource 
brokers. In reality, clients might submit a job with their constraints through brokers and let 
them handle the rest. Thus, GSPs might not know true clients’ constraints unless brokers 
share this information. However, brokers might not share it with GSPs if they do not have 
economic incentives to do so. Future work can study how to create incentives for brokers to 
cooperate. 
• We have assumed that jobs have the same size. In reality, this may not apply. Since clients 
may submit variety of different sizes of jobs to the grid, estimated computing time of each 
job must be taken into account when calculating its estimated price. To do so, an appropriate 
mechanism is required to estimate computing time of each request.  
• In the current model, there is no discount rate for clients when GSPs miss a preferred 
duration. Future work may include this rate when calculating client satisfaction. Although 
clients receive a result back after a preferred duration, they might still be satisfied with that 
service if they are happy with that discount rate. However, this does not mean that they are 
really satisfied with the service and willing to pay for it at the future time. Thus, future work 
can study the effect of discount rates on a true client satisfaction.  
• Instead of given demand scenarios, future work can study whether the model can be used to 
forecast market demand. To do so, GSPs might require further information from clients. This 
raises the question on what further information GSPs should obtain from clients. 
• Instead of commodity markets, future model may include other market models, such as 
auction and bargaining, and study their effectiveness. 
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• Future work can be extended to study the duration time for storing feedback data. As the 
model uses feedback data to construct a value profile as a proxy for a demand function, the 
data should be stored in a timely fashion to obtain the precise demand. GSPs might have to 
eliminate an out-of-date data. The challenge is finding the maximum time interval for storing 
the data.  
• To calibrate client satisfaction rate, we have used GSPs’ expected positive feedback as the 
upper bound rate. We have estimated the real rate by calculating the average value between 
the upper bound and the received rate. Instead of using the average value, future work can be 
extended to study other estimating methods. Furthermore, future work may improve the 
detection of untruthful feedback. 
• We have assumed that when any GSP decides to change its resource base affected by market 
demand, other GSPs will not change their resource base. Future work can examine strategic 
interactions among GSPs. Given that, market equilibrium point would be affected by the 
action of any GSPs in the market. Therefore, the first resulting equilibrium point will no 
longer be the optimal point for planning their resource base and will not provide the 
maximum profits. 
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APPENDIX A  
 
Server Cost of Ownership from TPC-C Benchmark
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Table A.1 GSP1: IBM System p5 570 Oracle 10g Release 2 Enterprise Edition 
 
 System # 1 Description 3-yr Cost 
Server Hardware IBM System p5 570 40,200 
 2-Way 2.2GHz POWER5+ Processor Card, 0-way active, 8 DDR2 27,400 
 One way Processor Activation for Processor FC 8338 54,800 
 Op Panel 199 
 Processor Cable 2,647 
 SP Flex Cable 1,324 
 16GB (4x4GB) DIMMS, 276 PIN, 533MHz, DDR2 SDRAM 242,480 
 73.4GB 15K RPM Ultra320 SCSI Disk Drive 1,318 
 4Gb Dual Port Fibre Channel 16,540 
 IDE Slimline DVD-ROM Drive 274 
 Processor Power Regulator 4,050 
 CEC Backplane 3,176 
 I/O Backplane 10,852 
 Midplane 1,324 
 DASD Backplane 3,176 
 Media Backplane 185 
 Power Midplane 530 
 System Port Riser Card 264 
 AC Power Supply, 240V, 1400W 4,236 
 FSP Service Processor Card 860 
 Power Cord, Drawer to IBM PDU 250V/10A 76 
 IBM Rack-mount Drawer Rail Kit 444 
 System Drawer Enclosure w/Bezel 926 
 Desktop Hardware Management Console 1,830 
 IBM T541H/L150P 15"TFT Display 508 
 IBM Full Width USB Keyboard 104 
 IBM 3-Button Optical Mouse - Black - USB 78 
 Subtotal 419,801 
   
Server Storage IBM System Storage EXP3000 67,179 
 IBM 3M SAS cable 5,670 
 IBM DS3000 Environmental Services Module (ESM) 20,979 
 IBM System Storage DS3400 Dual Controller Express 69,992 
 IBM Hot-Swap 3.5 inch 73.4GB 15K SAS HDD 93,936 
 IBM S2 42U Standard Rack 2,978 
 DS3400 Software Feature Pack 6,965 
 DS3000 Partition Expansion License 13,965 
 D-LINK DGS-1024D 24-Port 10/100/1000 Switch (2 spares) 609 
 ServicePac 24x7x4 Support (DS3400) 10,400 
 ServicePac 24x7x4 Support (EXP3000) 15,960 
 ServicePac 24x7x4 Support (Rack) 600 
 Subtotal 309,233 
   
Server Software Oracle Database 10g Release 2 Enterprise Edition, Per Processor 60,000 
 Oracle Database Server Support Package 12,000 
 Oracle Mandatory E-Business Discount (6,600) 
 Red Hat Enterprise Linux Advanced Platform, Premium 7,497 
 Subtotal 72,897 
   
 Total IBM Discounts (230,543) 
   
Available 04/04/08 Three-Year Cost of Ownership USD: $571,388 
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Table A.2 GSP2: IBM System p 570 Model 9117-MMA 
 
System # 2 Description 3-yr Cost 
Server Hardware Server 1:9117 Model MMA 17,341 
 GX Dual Port- 12X Channel Attach 1,499 
 Op Panel (MMA) 199 
 73.4GB SAS DASD, 15K RPM 1,318 
 One Processor Activation for Processor Feature #7380 107840 
 P6 Processor Power Regulator 4,500 
 System CEC Enclosure with Bezel 500 
 AC Power Supply, 200-240v, 1500 Watt 3,004 
 Media Enclosure and Backplane 185 
 I/O Riser, 2x Serial, 2x p5IO2C E'net (Evans) 399 
 Service Processor Interface 1,000 
 Processor Enclosure and Backplane 2,000 
 I/O Backplane 4,500 
 System Midplane 1,000 
 SAS DASD Backplane, 6-pk 1,051 
 Activation of 1GB DDR2- P6 Memory 290,880 
 0/32GB DDR2 Memory (4X8GB) DIMMS- 400 MHz- POWER6 
Memory 
161,316 
 System Ship Group 20 
 IDE Slimline DVD-ROM Drive 275 
 2-Port 10/100/1000 Base-TX Ethernet PCI 699 
 Line Cord, DRWR TO IBM PDU, 14', 200-240V/10A, 38 
 Rack Mount kit for IBM 19" rack 222 
 4.7GHz POWER6 -2 Core Processor Card, 0-core active 31,592 
 Power Distribution Backplane 265 
 IO Drawer 7314-G30 7,931 
 1.5M 12X ENHANCED IB CABLE 800 
 4 Gb Dual-Port Fibre Channel PCI-X 2.0 DDR 12,495 
 POWER CONTROL CABLE, 3M, (SPCN) 80 
 AC Power Supply 300 Watt 600 
 Dual Port 12X Channel Adapter 575 
 Line cord 28 
 Planer and Tray Assembly 1,300 
 Power Controll SPCN 250 
 I/O Drawer Mounting Enclosure 525 
 Rack Model T00 3,688 
 Front Trim Kit For 1.8 Meter Rack (Black) 158 
 Side Panel (Black) 300 
 PDU to 14', 200-240V/24A, UTG0247, PT#12 240 
 HMC 1:7310-C05 Desktop Hardw.Mgmt.Console 3,174 
 IBM ThinkVision C170 17-inch Color Monitor 250 
 Power Cord (6-foot), To Wall Plug Type #4 36 
 Ethernet Cable, 6M, HMC to System Unit 15 
 Keyboard - English, #103P 104 
 Mouse - Attachment Cable 78 
 Subtotal 664,270 
   
Server Storage DS4800 Disk System Model 82 269,975 
 DS4800 8-Storage Partitions 50,000 
 (22R4255) DS4800 AIX Host Kit 35,000 
 DS4000 EXP810 Enclosure 312,000 
 36GB/15K Drive 4Gb FC disks 695,760 
 Short Wave SFP 51,896 
 Fiber Cable 25m 1,890 
 Fiber Cable 1m 8,216 
 Warranty Service Upgrade 1812-81A 24x7x4 49,920 
 Warranty Service Upgrade 1815-82A 24x7x4 16,000 
 Subtotal 1,490,657 
 120 
Server Software AIX 5.3 (media only) 50 
 AIX Software per Processor 4,900 
 Software Maintenance for AIX  
 F5 SWMA for AIX per Processor 7,832 
 F5 Services 7x24 Support per Processor 1,984 
 Partition Load Manager SW Maint  
 F5 SWMA for AIX per Processor 220 
 F5 Services 7x24 Support per Processor 56 
 VIO Software Maintanance  
 Per Processor F5 VIO Maintenance 980 
 Per Processor F5 VIO Maint 24x7 Support 256 
 Initial Software Support   
 Per Processor Software Support 675 
 Per Processor 24x7 Software Support 236 
 C for AIX user Lic+SW maint 515 
 C for AIX user annual SW maint renewal 206 
 Oracle Database 10g Enterprise Edition, Per Processor, Unlimited 
Users 
60,000 
 Oracle Database Server Support Package 6,000 
 Subtotal 83,910 
   
 Total IBM Discounts (903,098) 
   
Available 11/26/07 Three-Year Cost of Ownership USD: $1,335,739 
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Table A.3 GSP3: IBM System x3950 M2 c/s Microsoft SQL Server 2005 
 
System # 3 Description 3-yr Cost 
Server Hardware IBM System x3950 M2 (2 x Intel Xeon Processor X7350 with 38,938 
     2.93GHz/2x4MB L2 Cache, 4 Memory Cards, 8 x 1GB DIMM,  
     onboard SAS enablement key, cables)  
 Intel Xeon Processor X7350 (2.93GHz/1066MHz FSB/2x4MB L2) 19,196 
 16GB (2x8GB) 667MHz PC2-5300 ECC DDR2 SDRAM DIMM 960,000 
 ServeRAID-MR10M SAS/SATA Controller 1,049 
 73.4GB 15K Hot Swap SAS 309 
 IBM T115 15-inch TFT Display 209 
 IBM Preferred Pro USB Keyboard 29 
 IBM 3-Button Optical Mouse - Black - USB 19 
 NetXtreme II 1000 Express Ethernet Adapter 558 
 PRO/1000 PT Dual-Port Server Adapter 269 
 ServicePac 24x7x4 Support (x3950 M2) 6,780 
 ServicePac 24x7x4 Support (Display) 90 
 Subtotal 1,027,446 
   
Server Storage IBM 4Gb FC Dual-Port PCI-E HBA for IBM System x 5,316 
 IBM System Storage DS4800 Midrange Disk Subsystem 377,965 
 4 Gbps SW SFP Transceiver 4 Pack 18,150 
 IBM 1m LC-LC Fibre Channel Cable 13,272 
 IBM 5m LC-LC Fibre Channel Cable 2,709 
 IBM System Storage DS4000 EXP810 Storage Exp. Unit 504,000 
 36.4GB 15K 4Gbps FC E-DDM Hot-Swap HDD 1,198,848 
 IBM TotalStorage SAN16B-2 8,240 
 B16 4-Port Activation 3,140 
 IBM System Storage EXP3000 6,398 
 500GB 3.5" Dual Port Hot-Swap SATA II 12,400 
 IBM EXP3000 1m Cable 238 
 IBM UPS 750TLV 299 
 IBM S2 42U Standard Rack 11,912 
 ServicePac 24x7x4 Support (EXP810) 80,640 
 ServicePac 24x7x4 Support (DS4800) 22,400 
 ServicePac 24x7x4 Support (SAN16B-2) 2,240 
 ServicePac 24x7x4 Support (EXP3000) 1,520 
 ServicePac 24x7x4 Support (Rack) 2,400 
 Subtotal 2,272,087 
   
Server Software Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Enterprise x64 Edition 199,992 
 Microsoft Windows Server 2003 R2 Enterprise x64 Edition 3,999 
 Microsoft Problem Resolution Services 245 
 Subtotal 204,236 
   
 Total IBM Discounts (686,583) 
   
Available 04/01/08 Three-Year Cost of Ownership USD: $2,817,186 
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Table A.4 GSP4: NEC Express5800/1320Xf C/S with Express5800/120Ri-2 
 
System # 4 Description 3-yr Cost 
Server Hardware Express5800/1320Xf system 1,971,736 
     Cabinet w/8cells&1IO  
     4 Itanium2 CPU(1.6G/24M) for 1320Xf  
     1320Xf Memory 16GB (4x4GB DIMM) memory kit  
     Memory Slot Expansion Module Option  
     IO Expansion Cabinet  
     IO Enclosure  
     1320Xf IO partition (Core)  
     1320Xf IO partition (Non-core)  
     73GB Ultra SCSI HDD 10k RPM  
     SCSI card  
     1port 10/100/1000 base-T LAN card  
     Basic Warranty Extension for Year 2 and 3  
     Year 1,2 &3 4 hour HW maintenance  
 NEC Express5800/120Ri-2 (for System Maintenance) 6,695 
     120Ri-2,XD2/3.0G/2G N8100-1248F  
     CPU Kit (XD2/3.0G(4))  
     Additional 2G Memory Board  
     1000Base-T NIC Dual Channel  
     Additional 36.3 GB HDD  
     Warranty Extension Year2&3  
     3Year 4h 24x7 support  
 NEC AccuSync500 (15" monitor) 480 
 FC HBA QLA2342 (+10% spares) 47,760 
 FC HBA QLA2462 (+2 spares) 5,052 
 Subtotal 2,031,723 
   
Server Storage NEC Storage D3-10 Base Model 1,344,000 
 SAS/SATA Enclosure 453,600 
 SAS disk drive (15k rpm/147GB) (+10% spares) 2,938,850 
 Software Base Product D3-10 Lite 571,200 
 4hr onsite maintenance service 473,645 
 Extended 1 year software warranty - per title 342,720 
 NEC Storage S2500 Base Model 31,000 
 S2500 FC Disk Expansion Box 18,600 
 Fibre channel disk drive (15k rpm/73GB) (+10% spares) 80,520 
 4hr onsite maintenance service 13,012 
 42U Rackframe 16,191 
 FC Cable 10M LC-LC (+10% spares) 4,750 
 Subtotal 6,288,088 
   
Server Software Red Hat Enterprise Linux Advanced Platform, Premium (Unlimited 
Sockets) 
7,497 
 Oracle Database 10g Enterprise Edition Per Processor, Unlimited Users 320,000 
 Partitioning, Per Processor, Unlimited Users 80,000 
 Database Server Support Package 6,000 
 Subtotal 413,497 
   
 Total NEC Discounts (3,858,455) 
   
Available 04/30/08 Three-Year Cost of Ownership USD: $4,874,853 
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Table A.5 GSP5: Bull Escala PL1660R 
 
System # 5 Description 3-yr Cost 
Server Hardware ESCALA NODE PL1660R (BASE DRAWER) 27,357 
 INDICATOR SYSTEM PL1660R PACKAGE  
 4.7GHZ P6, 2-CORE PROCESSOR CARD, 0-CORE ACTIVE 134,610 
 PROCESSOR POWER REGULATOR 18,000 
 ACTIVATION OF 256GB DDR2 POWER6 MEMORY 1,163,520 
 ONE PROC.ACTIVATION FOR 2-CORE&4.7 (P6) 448,256 
 EXPANSION CPU DRAWER FOR PL1660R 40,626 
 EXPANSION PCI-X I/O DRAWER 41,322 
 73 GB SAS DISK DRIVE (1"/15KRPM) 1,318 
 2X- 1GB VIRTUAL ETHERNET (RJ45) AND 2 SYSTEM 1,596 
 10/100/1000 BASE-TX ETHERNET PCI-X ADAPTER 2,120 
 2-PORT 10/100/1000 ETHERNET PCI-X ADAPTER 755 
 4GB/S FIBRE CHANNEL PCI-X ADAPTER 2-PORT 52,500 
 GX DUAL PORT - 12X HCA 1,499 
 IDE SLIMLINE DVD-ROM DRIVE 275 
 RACK 36U (BLACK) WITH ONE PDU - 12 OUTLETS 5,778 
 POWER SUPPLY TYPE EU  
 17" FLAT PANEL MONITOR 890 
 FULL WIDTH QUIET TOUCH KEYBOARD - USB, FR 100 
 ADDITIONAL POWER DISTRIBUTION UNIT - SINGLE PHA 1,000 
 0/256GB (32X8GB) DDR2, 400MHZ, 0GB ACTIVE 291,378 
 MEDIA ENCLOSURE AND BACK PLANE 185 
 KIT INTERCONNECT FOUR-DRAWER CABLES 30,000 
 KIT CABLES/FIRST EXPANSION DRAWER 515 
 I/O DRAWER MOUNTING ENCLOSURE (2 POSITIONS) 1,050 
 OPERATOR PANEL 199 
 DESKSIDE HMC W/O MONITOR/KEYBOARD 3,282 
 POWER CORD PDU/WALL (4.3M), 48A IEC309, 63A PLUG 480 
 POWER CORD (14-FOOT) - DRAWER TO PDU 240 
 NUMBER OF AIX PARTITIONS  
 ADVANCED POWER VIRTUALIZATION (PER CPU) 20,960 
 cable IB 3M 1,680 
 Subtotal 2,291,491 
   
Server Storage DS4800 Disk System Model 82 1,133,895 
 DS4800 8-Storage Partitions 210,000 
 (22R4255) DS4800 AIX Host Kit 147,000 
 DS4000 EXP810 Enclosure 1,488,000 
 72GB/15K Drive 4Gb FC disks 282,072 
 36GB/15K Drive 4Gb FC disks 2,954,304 
 Short Wave SFP 184,630 
 Fiber Cable 25m 7,938 
 Fiber Cable 1m 39,184 
 Warranty Service Upgrade 1812-81A 24x7x4 238,080 
 Warranty Service Upgrade 1815-82A 24x7x4 67,200 
 Subtotal 6,752,303 
   
Server Software AIX 5.3 (media only) 50 
 AIX Software per Processor 19,600 
 Software Maintenance for AIX 36,384 
 Partition Load Manager SW Maint 960 
 VIO Software Maintanance 6,480 
 Initial Installation PL1660R 500 
 C for AIX user Lic+SW maint 1,080 
 C for AIX user annual SW maint renewal 420 
 DB2 Enterprise Proc 9 Lic Maintenance 519,533 
 DB2 9 Enterprise Edition Proc Maint Renew 49,498 
 Subtotal 634,505 
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 Total Discounts (4,292,128) 
   
Available 12/16/07 Three-Year Cost of Ownership USD: $5,386,171 
 
 125 
Table A.6 GSP6: FUJITSU PRIMEQUEST 580 c/s w/96 Front-Ends 
 
System # 6 Description 3-yr Cost 
Server Hardware PRIMEQUEST 580 Base Unit 247,368 
 System Board 144,000 
 CPU Module(Dual core Itanium2 9050/1.6GHz/24MB L3/533MHz 1463,808 
 32GB Memory Module (4x8GB DDR2-400) 4,956,160 
 I/O Unit 105,000 
 BMC Module 1,720 
 Disk Drive Unit (3.5inch, 73GB, 10,000rpm, Ultra320) 680 
 Gigabit Switch Board (w/ 8 external 1000Base-T ports) 23,700 
 Additional Power Supply 7,600 
 External I/O Cabinet 20,850 
 PCI-Box 20,700 
 PCI Unit 15,510 
 PCI Unit Cable (5m) 2,670 
 FibreChannel Card (4Gbps, PCI-X, dual port) 153,720 
 FibreChannel Cable (15m, LC-LC) 23,760 
 Flat Panel Display 4,830 
 USB Keyboard 50 
 USB Mouse 26 
 Subtotal 7,192,152 
   
Server Storage ETERNUS8000 Model900 Base Unit 2,833,452 
 w/ 2 Controllers, 4 Drive Enclosures  
 Additional Expansion Rack 216,000 
 Additional Controllers (2 sets) 360,000 
 Cache Memory (2GBx4) 232,137 
 FibreChannel Host Interfaces (4Gbps, dual port, 2 sets) 460,800 
 Drive Enclosures for Base Unit (4 sets) 354,600 
 Drive Enclosures for Expansion Rack (4 sets) 1,674,000 
 Disk Drive Unit (73GB, 15,000rpm) 2,578,176 
 Subtotal 8,709,165 
   
Server Software Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 AS ( for Intel Itanium) 12,627 
 Oracle Database 10g Enterprise Edition, 640,000 
     Unlimited Users, Per Processor  
 Partioning, Unlimited Users, Per Processor 160,000 
 Oracle Database Server Support Package 6,000 
 Subtotal 818,627 
   
 Total Discounts (7,306,930) 
   
Available 04/30/08 Three-Year Cost of Ownership USD: $9,413,014 
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
Agents 
Agents are autonomous entities capable of making decisions based on their behavior, 
perspective, and encapsulated information. They can communicate and exchange information 
with each other to accomplish their own goals. 
 
Biased Clients 
Biased clients are clients who have an incentive to provide an unfair rating. 
 
Client’s Budget 
Budget is an amount of money available for each client to pay for a service in order to finish 
his/her total jobs.   
 
Client’s QoS threshold (λ j) 
Quality of service (QoS) threshold of each client represents the minimum level of service 
satisfaction that he/she can accept.  
 
Computing Time 
Computing time is the duration from submitting a job until receiving its result back.  
 
Computing Cost 
Computing cost is an amount of money that a client has to pay for a service. The computing cost 
can be either fixed or variable. The fixed computing cost is a fixed amount of money that a client 
agrees to pay after a service. The variable computing cost is calculated based on the actual 
resource consumption.  
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Cooperation 
Cooperation is a term used to describe a situation when clients always provide truthful feedback 
after a service. 
 
Credibility Mechanism 
Credibility mechanism is a mechanism that allows GSPs to detect untruthful feedback and 
penalize insincere or biased clients. 
 
Demand Theory 
The law of demand is usually presented as an inverse relation of price and quantity (such as the 
number of jobs). The higher the service price, the less the client will demand. 
 
Dominant Strategy 
A dominant strategy occurs when one strategy provide a better payoff than another strategy for 
one player, no matter what the other players are doing. 
 
Economies of scale 
Economies of scale refers to the decreased cost per unit as production is increased. 
 
Grid 
Grid refers to an infrastructure that enables the use of computing capacities owned and managed 
by multiple organizations. 
 
Grid Resources 
Resources refer to CPU cycles, memory space, disk space, and network bandwidth. 
 
Grid Resource Management System (Grid RMS) 
Grid RMS is a system developed to manage or allocate grid resources owned by multiple 
organizations. 
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Grid Service Provider (GSP) 
GSP is an agent who controls grid resources and sells computing capacity to clients as requested. 
 
Heterogeneous Grid Clients 
Heterogeneous grid clients are clients who have different preferences in term of budgets and 
preferred durations. 
 
Insincere Client 
Insincere clients are clients who have an incentive to cheat. 
 
Inverse Demand Curve 
An inverse demand curve represents the amount of goods (quantity) that buyers are willing to 
pay at various prices. 
 
Long-Run Average Total Cost (LATC) 
LATC is the unit cost of producing a service in the long run when all costs are variable. 
 
Market Demand 
At any price, market demand is the sum of the quantities demanded by each individual’s 
demand. 
 
Normal Profit 
Normal profit is a zero economic profit (where revenue equals cost) since economic profit does 
not occur in a perfectly competitive market in long-run equilibrium because of the free entry and 
exit of GSPs. 
 
P(contribution) 
P(contribution) is the probability that clients will provide feedback after a service. 
 
P(untruthful) 
P(untruthful) is the probability that clients’ feedback is untruthful. 
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Preferred Duration 
Preferred duration is the latest time by which client’s job should be completed. 
 
Rational Player 
A rational player is a player who makes a choice based on his/her maximum payoff without any 
concern for the other player’s payoff. 
 
Satisfaction 
Satisfaction means services were within clients’ budget and met clients’ preferred duration. 
 
Stakeholder 
Stakeholder is an individual in a system having an interest in one’s payoff.  
 
Untruthful Feedback 
Untruthful feedback is a term used to describe a feedback received from insincere or biased 
clients. 
 
Value Profile 
A value profile is a proxy for a demand function that represents client’s willingness-to-pay for 
grid resources. 
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